In Manik Lal Bhowmik Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, the Calcutta High Court has held that a charge sheet issued against an employee in a disciplinary proceedings, the enquiry report and the letter of dismissal are protected by qualified proceedings, the enquiry report and the letter of dismissal are protected by qualified privilege.
However, in the facts of the case two questions arise on the answer of which will depend the success or failure of this suit. Firstly, has the suit been filed within the time period specified in the Limitation Act, 1963? Secondly, assuming that the answer to the first question is in favour of the plaintiff, is the defence of absolute or qualified privilege available to the defendant?
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be
dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Thus, it is obligatory on the part of the Court to dismiss the suit if it is filed after the prescribed period even though the defendant has not pleaded the defence of limitation. [Please see State of Orissa-vs.-Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436]. Although where two views are possible, the Court ought to lean in favour of the subsistence of the right to sue and against limitation, but where the claim is clearly barred by time, the Court must unhesitatingly dismiss the suit.
Article 75 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the time period for initiating an action for compensation for libel is one year from the date when the libel is published. In the present
case, the charge-sheet was issued on 30 July, 1993. The enquiry report was submitted on 20 May, 1999 and the dismissal order removing the plaintiff from service was issued on 30 September, 1999.
Hence, at the latest the plaintiff’s cause of action arose on 30 September, 1999 and the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit within one year from that date. Even though strictly speaking, in my opinion,
the plaintiff’s alleged cause of action arose on 30 July, 1993 when the charge-sheet was issued, to give the plaintiff the benefit of doubt I proceed on the basis that there was republication of the libellous materials on 20 May, 1999 i.e. the date of the enquiry report and again on 30 September, 1999 i.e. date of the dismissal order. It is settled law each publication of a defamatory imputation furnishes the plaintiff with a fresh cause of action. Even taking the most liberal approach in favour of the plaintiff, in my opinion, the plaintiff’s claim became time barred on 30 September, 2000.
The Hon'ble court held that privilege is of two kinds, absolute and qualified. A statement is absolutely privileged when no action lies for if even though it is false and defamatory and made with express malice. On certain occasions the interest of society require that a man should speak out his mind
fully and frankly without fear of consequences, e.g. in Parliamentary proceedings or in the course of judicial, military, naval or state proceedings. To such occasions, the law attaches an absolute privilege. It is based on the principle that the interest of the community at large overrides the interest of the individual.
A statement is said to have qualified privilege when no action lies for it though it is false and defamatory, unless the plaintiff proves express malice. These are, broadly speaking, communications made in the course of legal, judicial or military duty for protection of common interest or for public good and reports of parliamentary and judicial proceedings and proceedings at public meetings.
When the defendant sets up the plea that the publication has a qualified privilege, the plaintiff must prove the existence of an express malice which may be inferred either from the excessive language of the defamatory matter itself or from any facts that show that the defendant was actuated by
spite or some oblique motive.
However, in the facts of the case two questions arise on the answer of which will depend the success or failure of this suit. Firstly, has the suit been filed within the time period specified in the Limitation Act, 1963? Secondly, assuming that the answer to the first question is in favour of the plaintiff, is the defence of absolute or qualified privilege available to the defendant?
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be
dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Thus, it is obligatory on the part of the Court to dismiss the suit if it is filed after the prescribed period even though the defendant has not pleaded the defence of limitation. [Please see State of Orissa-vs.-Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436]. Although where two views are possible, the Court ought to lean in favour of the subsistence of the right to sue and against limitation, but where the claim is clearly barred by time, the Court must unhesitatingly dismiss the suit.
Article 75 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the time period for initiating an action for compensation for libel is one year from the date when the libel is published. In the present
case, the charge-sheet was issued on 30 July, 1993. The enquiry report was submitted on 20 May, 1999 and the dismissal order removing the plaintiff from service was issued on 30 September, 1999.
Hence, at the latest the plaintiff’s cause of action arose on 30 September, 1999 and the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit within one year from that date. Even though strictly speaking, in my opinion,
the plaintiff’s alleged cause of action arose on 30 July, 1993 when the charge-sheet was issued, to give the plaintiff the benefit of doubt I proceed on the basis that there was republication of the libellous materials on 20 May, 1999 i.e. the date of the enquiry report and again on 30 September, 1999 i.e. date of the dismissal order. It is settled law each publication of a defamatory imputation furnishes the plaintiff with a fresh cause of action. Even taking the most liberal approach in favour of the plaintiff, in my opinion, the plaintiff’s claim became time barred on 30 September, 2000.
The Hon'ble court held that privilege is of two kinds, absolute and qualified. A statement is absolutely privileged when no action lies for if even though it is false and defamatory and made with express malice. On certain occasions the interest of society require that a man should speak out his mind
fully and frankly without fear of consequences, e.g. in Parliamentary proceedings or in the course of judicial, military, naval or state proceedings. To such occasions, the law attaches an absolute privilege. It is based on the principle that the interest of the community at large overrides the interest of the individual.
A statement is said to have qualified privilege when no action lies for it though it is false and defamatory, unless the plaintiff proves express malice. These are, broadly speaking, communications made in the course of legal, judicial or military duty for protection of common interest or for public good and reports of parliamentary and judicial proceedings and proceedings at public meetings.
When the defendant sets up the plea that the publication has a qualified privilege, the plaintiff must prove the existence of an express malice which may be inferred either from the excessive language of the defamatory matter itself or from any facts that show that the defendant was actuated by
spite or some oblique motive.
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