Legal Reference Library

The Supreme Court, in Venu vs Ponnusamy Reddiar, has held that there is no limitation period for the execution of preliminary decree for partition. In 1989, an application for execution of the decree was filed after 30 years of the preliminary decree for partition, which was passed in 1959. It prayed for the appointment of a court commissioner so as to carry out the preliminary decree. The  high court had rejected the contention that since the application had been filed for the appointment of court commissioner, it ought to governed by provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963. A bench comprising Justice Arun Mishra and Justice Amitava Roy observed that a preliminary decree for partition crystallises the rights of parties for seeking partition to the extent declared, the equities remain to be worked out in final decree proceedings and till partition is carried out and final decree is passed, there is no question of any limitation running against right to claim partit...

In a significant judgment Supreme Court in NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. VS. HINDUSTAN SAFETY GLASS WORKS LTD. held that provision of limitation in the Consumer Protection Act cannot be strictly construed to disadvantage a consumer. The Bench comprising Justices Madan B Lokur and PC Pant held that in a dispute concerning a consumer, it is necessary for the courts to take a pragmatic view of the rights of the consumer principally since it is the consumer who is placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the supplier of services or goods.

The Supreme Court, in M/s. Purohit and Company vs. Khatoonbee, has observed that though there is no limitation period to raise a claim for compensation before a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, it should be done within a reasonable time. A three-judge bench headed by Chief Justice of India JS Khehar was considering an appeal against a high court order which had upheld the justiciability of a claim petition filed 28 years after the accident took place on the ground that no period of limitation had been provided for raising a claim for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The bench agreed with the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants, that even though there may no longer be a defined period of limitation for approaching the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to raise a claim for compensation (under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), yet a claimant must approach a court for raising such a claim within a reasonable time. The only reason stated in the c...

The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rahul Jain Vs Smt. Namrata Jain has held that the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised to correct all errors of a judgment of a Court acting within its limitation. Such jurisdiction can be “exercised where the orders is passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice”, the court observed. The court upheld the order of trial court that dismissed an application filed by the petitioner under Order 16 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code to summon a particular witness in his divorce case.  The court found on the date the issues were framed in the divorce case the petitioner did not filed any list of witnesses nor made any request to summon a particular witness. Justice Vandana Kasrekar held the trial court has not passed the order “in violation of fundamental principles of law and justice warranting interference of this Court under Ar...

In Manik Lal Bhowmik Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, the Calcutta High Court has held that a charge sheet issued against an employee in a disciplinary proceedings, the enquiry report and the letter of dismissal are protected by qualified proceedings, the enquiry report and the letter of dismissal are protected by qualified privilege. However, in the facts of the case two questions arise on the answer of which will depend the success or failure of this suit. Firstly, has the suit been filed within the time period specified in the Limitation Act, 1963? Secondly, assuming that the answer to the first question is in favour of the plaintiff, is the defence of absolute or qualified privilege available to the defendant? Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence...

In Hazi Jahangir Molla Vs. Md. Alim Mallick, the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court decided that Part payment cannot defeat the entire cause of action. Further Even if one person who has no money lending licence cannot be debarred from granting any accommodation loan to his friend or other person on him he has confidence. The opposite party took the accommodation loan and he cannot take the shelter of the money lenders’ act to defraud the person who accommodated him. Taking into consideration the factual aspects of this case this revisional application is to be decided on the following points. (1) Whether the demand notice was defective as because a part payment to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- was accepted and that is the departure from the cause of action itself? (2) Whether the complaint is barred by limitation? (3) Whether the cheque was issued in discharge of existing liability? (4) Whether the part payment of cheque is enough to defeat the entire cause of action? (5) W...

The single bench of Justice Sadhna Jadhav of the Bombay High Court in Shri Lonkaran Chothmalji Parmar vs The State of Maharashtra  has refused to grant bail to an accused under various sections of the Indian Penal Code including wrongful confinement, rape. He has also been booked under three sections of Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences Act(POCSO). The accused had filed a bail application under Section 439 of the CrPC. An FIR has been lodged by the 20 year old girl who claims to have been 15 at the time of the crime. The FIR was lodged at Panchvati Police Station, Nashik. She says that the applicant had participated in facilitating her marriage with one Nitin Jain. She later learnt from Jain that he had in fact “purchased her 5 lakhs” and that he was from Rajasthan not Ahmedabad contrary to what she was told. She was sexually abused. He refused to “give her the status of a wife.” She later gave birth to two children. Nitin however had abandoned her and was residing in a d...

High Court of Delhi National Highway Authority of India v. Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited MANU/DE/2834/2016 19.10.2016 Arbitration Once the parties have approached certain court for relief under Arbitration Act at earlier stages of disputes then it is same court that, parties must return to for all other subsequent proceedings Present application filed by National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) seeking to explain delay of 296 days in filing Petition under Section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act) to challenge Award dated 24th February, 2015 of Arbitral Tribunal (AT) in disputes between NHAI and Respondent, Hindustan Steelworks Construction Ltd + SIPL (HSCL) arising out of a contract dated 18th July, 2005 for construction of a four lane highway. It is stated by NHAI that it received a copy of the Award dated 24th February, 2015 only on 27th February, 2015 by courier and that was the date from which the period of limitation for the purpo...

Prashanth Projects Ltd vs. DCIT Human interaction is influenced by human nature. Inherent in human nature is the likelihood of error. Therefore, the adage “to err is human”. Thus, the power to condone delay while applying the law of limitation. This power of condonation is only in view of human fallibility. The laws of nature are not subject to human error, thus beyond human correction. In fact, the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pradip Kumar 2000(7) SCC 372 has observed to the effect that although the law assists the vigilant, an unintentional lapse on the part of the litigant would not normally close the doors of adjudication so as to be permanently closed, as it is human to err Condonation of delay: An appeal wrongly filed before the AO and not CIT(A) is an unintentional lapse of the assessee. The AO ought to have returned the appeal to enable the assessee to take corrective steps. The likelihood of error is inherent in human nature The power of condonation is in view...

The Government, being the largest litigant, has to be a model and ideal litigant, a division bench of the Bombay High Court comprising of Justices S.C. Dharmadhikari and Dr. Shalini Phansalkar Joshi has observed while refusing to condone the delay by the Government in preferring Appeals.  The Bench also observed that merely because applicant is a State, delay in filing appeals cannot be condoned without a proper explanation as Section 5 of the Limitation Act is equally applicable to the State as well. The reasons of delay stated in notice of motion, filed by Government read “”the delay is due to various factum, especially, related to procedural mandate in Government functioning, which were not in the control of the Applicant-Appellant“. In another notice of motion filed, the delay was attributed to “the various internal correspondence of the Revenue Department with its superior authorities, for seeking permission to file the Appeal” Observing that there is no ‘sufficient cause’ sta...

the Calcutta High Court has adopted a “pragmatic” approach towards condonation of delay on the part of state observing that deliberate lapses and inaction on the part of the officers of the State cannot be a ground to sacrifice justice. The Court observed that Corporation as such is not responsible for the delay but its officers/agents. The First Bench presided by the then Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court Dr. Manjula Chellur (Presently Chief Justice of Bombay High Court), in Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Anr. Vs. The Cricket Association of Bengal, imposed a cost of one lakh and directed corporation to take action against those erring officials and also to recover the costs from those officers who are responsible for the delay. A delay of 299 days had occurred on the part of Corporation in filing appeal in the matter of demand of advertisement tax imposed by Calcutta Municipal Corporation so far as the advertisements undertaken within the Eden Garden grounds by the Cricket As...

The Supreme Court of India in Madina Begum & Anr. Vs. Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey has observed that it is unfortunate that the Parties have to undergo another round of litigation because of non-consideration of settled legal priciples by High Court. The apex Court has reiterated that, in the absence of a specified date for the performance of the agreement,the limitation period of three years,prescribed in Article 54 of the Limitation Act, for filing Suit for Specific Performance of Contract would begin when the plaintiff has notice that the defendant has refused the performance of the agreement. The Bench comprising of Justices Madan B. Lokur and R.K. Agrawal also held that, the High Court when it acts as First Appellate Court, has a duty to deal with all the issues and evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The High Court in this case, had reversed the finding of Trial Court and held that the Suit is barred for limitation. The High Court did not go into the merits...

While rendering relief to a woman who failed to procure back her gold ornaments from Muthoot Finance Pvt. Ltd., which were pledged while taking a loan, NCDRC directed the Finance Company to reimburse the woman with the current value of 52 grams gold pledged in 2003 with it. Earlier, in Year 2003, the complainant pledged 52 grams of gold for Rs 21,000 with the Paravoor branch of Muthoot Finance Pvt. Ltd. When she approached the concerned branch in April 2004 to take back the ornaments by paying the loan amount with interest, they refused, saying that the ornaments had been transferred to their head office by mistake. Thereafter, she left the town where she was then living and settled in Ernakulam. In May 2011, she approached the Finance Company again to redeem the ornaments pledged, but the said ornaments were not returned to her. Being aggrieved, she approached District Forum with a complaint. Before the Forum, Company contended that the complaint was barred by limitation...

This division bench of S. Manikumar and D. Krishnakumar, JJ held that there can be no order for condonation of delay beyond the extended period of limitation, stating that when the legislative intent is indicated by the provisions of special laws that exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act, then authorities under such statutes cannot exercise power to condone the delay. The Court dismissed the writ appeal filed by the Appellant under Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994 against the refusal of condonation of a delay of 223 days in proceedings before the Commissioner of Service Tax (Appeals). The Court noticed that Section 85 of the Finance Act) provides that appeal be filed 3 months from date of communication of order, while the Commissioner (Appeals) is empowered to condone delays of a further three months if satisfied of sufficient cause. The Court noted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which permits the Court to exercise its discretion in condonation of ...

The Calcutta High Court has quashed Show-cause cum demand notice demanding Service Tax from former Indian Cricket Team captain, Saurav Ganguly. Justice Arijit Banerjee said that that mere failure to disclose a transaction or activity and pay tax thereon or a mere misstatement is not sufficient for invocation of the extended period of limitation, which has been done in this case. The Court also held that the remuneration received by the former Skipper for writing articles and anchoring TV shows would not attract service tax. The court also observed that “brand endorsement” was not a taxable service during the period of time for which the tax demand was raised, and hence such demand cannot be sustained. The Court also said that Ganguly while he played for Indian Premier League (IPL) was not rendering any service which could be classified as business support service. NON-DISCLOSURE SIMPLICITOR CANNOT BE CALLED ‘SUPPRESSION OF FACTS’ An amount of Rs. 1, 51, 66,500, was demanded from the fo...

Madras High Court in R.Gowrishankar vs. The Commissioner of Service Tax has held that Appellate authorities cannot be asked to condone the delay, beyond the extended period of limitation A Division Bench comprising of Justices S. Manikumar and D. Krishnakumar, made this observation while considering an appeal filed against Single Bench order declining to set aside the order made in the condone delay petition filed by the petitioner to condone 223 days in filing the appeal before the Commissioner of Service Tax (Appeals). The Court referring to Apex Court decisions in Singh Enterprises v. CCE, Jamshedpur reported in 2008 (221) ELT 163 (SC), Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., reported in 2009 (236) ELT 417 (SC), Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission reported in 2010 (5) SCC 23, observed that it is well settled that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied, beyond the condonable period. The Court obser...

Supreme Court in VLS Finance Ltd. & Anr. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, has held that an operative period of interim stay order by the High Court which affects passing of Assessment Order by the Assessment Officer is also to be excluded for purpose of computing Limitation Period under Section 158BE(2) of Income Tax Act. Explanation 1 to Section 158BE (2) of the Income Tax Act states that the period during which the assessment proceeding is stayed by an order or injunction of any court, shall be excluded from computing the period of limitation with regard to block Assessment. If stay of some other nature is granted by the court than the stay of the assessment proceedings, whether such period can be excluded under this provision?This was the question before the Apex Court. Division Bench of Justices A.K. Sikri and R.F Nariman held that in those cases where stay of some other nature is granted by the court than the stay of the assessment proceedings, but the effect of such stay is to...

Limitation Act, 1963 — Art. 61 — Usufructuary mortgage : There is no fixed time-limit for usufructuary mortgagor to seek redemption and recovery of possession of immovable property mortgaged. Right to seek redemption, would accrue not from date of creation of mortgage but from date of payment of mortgage money out of usufructs or partly out of usufructs and partly on payment or deposit by mortgagor as provided under S. 62 of TP Act. Until then, limitation would not start under Art. 61 and as such, mere expiry of period prescribed thereunder would not extinguish mortgagor’s right of redemption and entitle mortgagee to seek declaration of title and ownership over mortgaged property. Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, (2014) 9 SCC 185

Narayan Vs. Babasaheb & Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 3486 of 2016 arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 15966 of 2012] N.V. RAMANA, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellant is before us aggrieved by the Judgment and decree passed by the High Court of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad, dated 5.10.2011 in Second Appeal No.213 of 2004 wherein and whereby the High Court has confirmed the judgment and decree of the Courts below. 3. This Court, while issuing notice on 27th April, 2012, has passed the following order: "Delay condoned. Issue notice returnable in ten weeks limited to the question as to whether the Suit filed in the year 1989 with regard to the sale deed dated January 20, 1982 was within limitation. Dasti, in addition to the ordinary process. In the meanwhile, the parties shall maintain status quo with regard to the property which is subject matter of the sale deed dated January 20, 1982." 4. In the light of the order passed by this Court on 27.04.2012, we...

A 3 Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Econ Antri Ltd. Vs. Rom Industries Ltd. & Anr. has recently answered a reference whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose?. While answering the reference, the Supreme Court held as under: On 13/10/2006, while granting leave in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.211 of 2005, this Court passed the following order: “In our view, the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the appellant in the case of Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securities Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 1 requires reconsideration. Orders of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice may be obtained for placing this matter before a larger Bench.” Pursuant to the above order, this appeal is placed before us. 2. Since the referral order states that the judgment of this Court in Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securiti...