Other Supreme Court Cases till 2015

• Service Law — Promotion — Entitlement to promotion - Complete denial of promotion forever cannot be comprehended under Arts. 14 and 16 of Constitution. Once a service gets merged with another service, the employee concerned has a right to get positioned appropriately in the merged service. That is the plain meaning of “absorption”. Chances of promotion are not conditions of service, but negation of even the chance of promotion certainly amounts to variation in the conditions of service attracting infraction of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. No employee has a right to particular position in the seniority list but all employees have a right to seniority since the same forms the basis of promotion. Panchraj Tiwari v. M.P. SEB, (2014) 5 SCC 101

• Constitution of India — Arts. 21, 14, 32, 142 and 136 — Communal riots — Muzaffarnagar Riots, 2013 - In light of various steps taken by State Government for rehabilitation, protection and other preventive measures, facts and figures, statistics supported by materials, there is no need to either constitute SIT (Special Investigation Team) or entrust investigation to CBI at this juncture. Special Investigation Cell (SIC) constituted by State Government directed to continue with investigations. Further directions passed for proper proceedings to be completed in respect of various offences alleged to be committed and for relief and rehabilitation of riot victims. Mohd. Haroon v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 252

• Constitution of India — Arts. 26(d) and 226 — Religious denomination - Podu Dikshitars (Smarthi Brahmins) constitute a religious denomination and have exclusive privilege and right to participate in administration of properties of Temple concerned dedicated to Lord Natraja. High Court’s decision dt.  13-12-1951 to that effect in Marimuthu Dikshithar, (1952) 1 MLJ 557, has attained finality. This decision, making declaration of status of Dikshitars, is a judgment in rem. It would operate as res judicata against any subsequent decision on that issue. Hence subsequent re-examination of that issue by the High Court by assuming as if it had jurisdiction to sit in appeal against its earlier decision of 1951 which had attained finality and taking view that earlier decision would not operate as res judicata, impermissible. Subramanian Swamy v. State of T.N., (2014) 5 SCC 75

• Criminal Trial — Investigation — Defective or illegal investigation - As a very heinous case of rape and murder of six year old girl child and amputation of her legs to rob her anklets, ended in acquittal due to lapses in investigation and prosecution, lapses committed by investigating and prosecuting agencies, stringently deprecated and directions issued for purposeful and decisive investigation and prosecution in the matter. State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai, (2014)

• Courts, Tribunals and Judiciary — Role of Judiciary — Duty of Superior Courts - Superior courts should not pass caustic remarks on subordinate courts unless facts disclose designed effort to frustrate cause of justice with mala fide intention. Bona fide errors should not invite disparaging remarks. Judges do commit errors which are to be corrected by superior courts. Superior courts can convey their anxiety to subordinate courts through their orders which should be authoritative but not uncharitable. Use of derogatory language should be avoided which invariably has demoralizing effect on subordinate judiciary. Sujoy Kumar Chanda v. Damayanti Majhi, (2014) 5 SCC 181

• Constitution of India — Art. 21 — Right to Reputation - Right to reputation is an inseparable facet of Art. 21. Recording of disparaging remarks by Single Judge which were affirmed by Division Bench of High Court against appellant Chief Minister which were unnecessary to adjudicate upon issues, visiting him with adverse consequences in proceedings where he was not impleaded as party, is improper. When court deals with matter which is likely to affect person’s reputation, normative principles of law should be cautiously and carefully adhered to which should be sans emotions and sans populist perception and absolutely in accord with doctrine of audi alteram partem before anything adverse is recorded. Expunction of such remarks, directed. When caustic observations are made which are not necessary as integral part of adjudication and it affects person’s reputation, a cherished right under Art. 21 is violated. Om Prakash Chautala v. Kanwar Bhan, (2014) 5 SCC 417

• Contempt of Court — Generally — Safeguarding Judicial System - In the matter of continuous wilful disobedience of court orders, there is essential need of an iron hand to enforce rule of law, punish contemnors and maintain faith and confidence of people in the judiciary. Non-compliance with judicial orders shakes the very foundation of judicial system and undermines the rule of law which Supreme Court is bound to honour and protect. This is essential to maintain faith and confidence of the people in judiciary. Therefore, detained contemnors who had been wilfully and continuously disobeying orders of Supreme Court, refused bail, until they complied with the court orders. SEBI v. Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd., (2014) 5 SCC 429

• Criminal Trial — Witnesses — Child/Young witness - Evidence of a child witness must be subjected to close scrutiny to rule out possibility of tutoring. It can be relied upon, if court finds that child witness has sufficient intelligence and understanding of obligation of oath. As a matter of caution, court must find adequate corroboration to child witness’ evidence. If it is found reliable and truthful and corroborated by other evidence on record, it can be accepted without hesitation. Radhey Shyam v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 5 SCC 389

• Environment Protection and Pollution Control — Encroachment/Diversion of/Intrusion into forest land - Cases Reported in 2014 SCC VOL. 6 July 7, 2014 Part 2  - Use of 0.6556 ha of forest land falling in Kutch Desert Wildlife Sanctuary by BSF for construction of Repeater Station as recommended by Standing Committee of National Board for Wildlife, allowed subject to conditions. Use of 124.054 ha of forest land within Majathal Wildlife Sanctuary in Himachal Pradesh for construction of Hydroelectric Project by NTPC, permitted, as cleared by Standing Committee of NBW and by CEC subject to conditions. Permission for use of 11.541 ha of forest land falling within Tadgarh-Raoli Wildlife Sanctuary for upgradation and widening of existing NH 8 between Beawar and Gomtipur chauraha also granted, subject to conditions laid down by Chief Wildlife Warden. T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 167

• Public Accountability, Vigilance and Prevention of Corruption — Sting/Undercover Operations - Cases Reported in 2014 SCC VOL. 6 July 14, 2014 Part 3 - Criminal liability of sting operation conducted by private person on being charged for having deployed means which themselves involve culpable act such as offering bribe to main offender is not obliterated merely because operation is claimed to be conducted in public interest as a journalistic exercise. Question would arise whether offer of bribe was only a pretence or it was with intention of getting some favour in return. Mens rea or criminal intention of sting operator has to be proved by prosecution on basis of surrounding facts established by material on record in a full-fledged trial. Rajat Prasad v. CBI, (2014) 6 SCC 495

• Education and Universities — Appointment/Recruitment — Illegal appointments: 
  Continuance in office of those selected by unfair and unreasonable means amounts to perpetuating the wrong. That beneficiaries of such faulty selection process should hold on to the benefit only because of lapse of time would be travesty of justice especially when deserving candidates were left out with a brooding sense of injustice and cynicism against the efficacy of the system that was meant to act fairly and objectively. Hence, as there were illegalities and irregularities in selection and appointment process of Senior and Junior Research Assistants, cancellation of said appointments by Chancellor of Dr Punjabrao Deshmukh Krishi Vidyapeeth, held valid. Hitendra Singh v. P.D. Krishi Vidyapeeth, (2014) 8 SCC 369

• Information Technology Act, 2000 — Ss. 66-A, 69-A and 79 — Constitutionality: While an informed citizenry is a precondition for meaningful governance, the culture of open dialogue is generally of great societal importance. The ultimate truth is evolved by “free trade in ideas” in a competitive “marketplace of ideas”. S. 66-A of Information Technology Act, 2000 ropes in all kinds of information disseminated over internet regardless of content of information and irrespective of whether the same falls within realm of discussion or advocacy causing only annoyance, inconvenience, etc. to some (which is permissible), or the same causes incitement leading to imminent causal connection with any of eight subject-matters contained in Art. 19(2) of the Constitution (which is not permissible). S. 66-A affects right of people to know, thus is violative of Art. 19(1)(a) and not saved by Art. 19(2) of the Constitution, hence, struck down in its entirety. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1

• Penal Code, 1860 — S. 304-B — Dowry death: To attract conviction under S. 304-B, prosecution should adduce evidence to show that “soon before her death”, deceased victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. There must always be a proximate and live link between effects of cruelty based on dowry demand and death concerned. Major Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 5 SCC 201 

• Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 357 and 357-A — Compensation to victims of offence: Apart from sentence and fine/compensation to be paid by accused, court has to award compensation to be paid by the State under S. 357-A when the accused is not in a position to pay fair compensation. State of M.P. v. Mehtaab, (2015) 5 SCC 197

• Penal Code, 1860 — S. 304-A — Causing death by negligence: There is nonchalant attitude among Indian drivers, driving in a rash and negligent manner (whether in drunken state or not) or youthful adventurous enthusiasm, as if there are no traffic rules or no discipline of law. Nobody should ever get oblivious of fact that in such accidents precious lives are lost or victims who survive are crippled for life, which is worse than death. Hence, there is an urgent need to scrutinise, relook at and revisit sentencing policy under S. 304-A of Penal Code. State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182

• Customs — Countervailing duty (CVD) — Levy of additional duty on imported articles — Benefit of Noti. No. 64/93-CE dt. 28-2-1993 issued under R. 8 of Central Excise Rules, 1944: Aim of exemption Noti. No. 64/93-CE granting additional exemption of 10% countervailing duty is to extend benefits to importers of saloon cars to use said cars for tourist taxis. Thus, for the purpose of getting benefit of remission of CVD under concession notification, importer shall be treated as manufacturer. Since CVD is imposed on importer as if it were on a manufacturer and as if it were excise duty, importer would be entitled to payment of concessional/reduced rate of countervailing duty in terms of any notification providing for such exemption/remission of excise duty for a like article if produced/manufactured in India. Aidek Tourism Services (P) Ltd. v. Commr. of Customs, (2015) 7 SCC 429

• Evidence Act, 1872 — S. 132 and proviso thereto — Abrogation of law of privilege in India under: S. 132 proviso is a necessary corollary of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution, the former protecting witnesses from self-incrimination, the latter protecting accused from self-incrimination. Policy under S. 132 of the Evidence Act, 1872 appears to be to secure evidence from whatever sources it is available for doing justice in a case brought before the court. In the process of securing such evidence, if a witness who is under obligation to state the truth, makes any statement which will incriminate or tend to expose such a witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind, the proviso to S. 132 of the Evidence Act, 1872 grants immunity to such a witness by declaring that “no such answer given by the witness shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding”. R. Dinesh kumar v. State, (2015) 7 SCC 497

• Excise — Classification of goods — Interpretation of Tariff Entry: Inclusion of products in an entry is based on primary use of product. When primary use of product is security and not quality of being adhesive as in present case (security holograms), factor of adhesiveness is incidental to primary use to which goods are put, namely, that they are to be used for security purposes. Holostick India Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 401

• Income Tax — Business or Revenue Expenditure — Interest — Deductibility of, under S. 36(1)(iii), IT Act, 1961: Only prerequisites for deductibility of interest are that: (a) interest was paid on capital borrowed by assessee, (b) this   borrowing was for purpose of business or profession of assessee. If these two prerequisites are established, assessee is entitled to deduction of full amount of interest in AY in which it is incurred or paid. Revenue can only examine genuineness of the business borrowing, and that it was for business purposes and not an illusionary and colourable transaction. Once said genuineness is established, Revenue cannot question rate of interest, either that it is too high or too low, or tamper with transaction/scheme of borrowing in any way. Taparia Tools Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 7 SCC 540

• Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (30 of 1999) — Ss. 2(1)(d), (e) & (f) & 3 and 21(4) — Applicability of: Minimum three offences are required to constitute “continuing unlawful activity” for applicability of MCOCA and all three offences concerned should fall within definition of “organised crime” and should have been committed by accused concerned as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of an organized crime syndicate either singly or jointly. Even if the earlier two offences were not initiated under the provisions of MCOCA such offences should have been capable of being brought within the provisions of MCOCA, namely, as part of an activity of an organised crime syndicate either by its own members either singly or jointly or though not as a member but such participation should have been on behalf of an “organised crime syndicate”. Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 7 SCC 440

• Information Technology, Internet, Computer and Cyber Laws — Social Networking: Facebook is a public forum. It facilitates expression of public opinion. Posting of one’s grievances against Government machinery, even on Government Facebook page does not by itself amount to criminal conduct. Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423

• Central Excise Act, 1944 — S. 11-A — Show-cause notice before passing of recovery order — Mandatory requirement of: Order passed under S. 11-A without any notice to respondents as required is bad and this cannot be reagitated. [Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd., (2015) 9 SCC 102]

• Constitution of India — Art. 21 — Quashment on ground of delay in initiation of criminal proceedings/filing criminal complaint: While it is true that cases covered by statutory bar of limitation may be liable to be quashed without any further enquiry, cases not covered by statutory bar can be quashed on ground of delay in filing of criminal complaint in appropriate cases. In such cases, question for consideration is, whether there is violation of right of speedy trial, which has been held to be part of Art. 21 of Constitution, having regard to nature of offence, extent of delay, person responsible for delay and other attending circumstances. However, mere delay in completion of proceedings, may not be, by itself, a ground to quash proceedings, where offences are serious but court, having regard to conduct of parties, nature of offence and extent of delay in facts and circumstances of given case, may quash proceedings in exercise of jurisdiction under S. 482 CrPC, in the interest of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court. [Sirajul v. State of U.P., (2015) 9 SCC 201]

• Excise — Dutiable Event/Excisable Goods/Liability/Exigibility to Excise: Excise duty is payable on intermediate goods/products. Hence, transmission assembly which comes into existence during the manufacture of tractors made by the appellant is exigible to excise duty. Fact that not a single sale of such assembly had been made by appellants would have no effect on exigibility. [Escorts Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 9 SCC 109]

• Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 406, 409, 415 and 420 — Criminal breach of trust and cheating: As none of the essential ingredients for criminal breach of trust and cheating, which are; entrustment of property/acting as banker, factor, agent, etc./inducement of delivery of property by deception, present in the case, proceedings quashed. [Robert John D’Souza v. Stephan V. Gomes, (2015) 9 SCC 96]

• Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — S. 19 and S. 13(1)(d) r/w S. 13(2) — Sanction for prosecution: Since power to grant sanction for prosecution already existed with Secretary, Department of Law and Legislative Affairs from February 1988 and Circular dt. 28-2-1998 only clarified that Secretary, Department of Law and Legislative Affairs was competent authority not only in respect of investigations made by Lokayukta Organisations but also EOW. Besides, after amendment of relevant rules, conferred power to grant sanction for prosecution on Secretary, Department of Law and Legislative Affairs, Administrative Department of State had no power to decline sanction, hence, order of High Court quashing sanction for prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, set aside. [State of M.P. v. Anand Mohan, (2015) 9 SCC 35]

• Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/34 — Murder of child — Child offered as sacrifice in practice of Tantrism — Appreciation of evidence: As the case of respondent-accused mainly based on circumstantial evidence, respondent-accused, rightly given benefit of doubt in the case of murder of child. [State of U.P. v. Satveer, (2015) 9 SCC 44]

• Penal Code, 1860 — S. 376 — Rape of minor of unsound mind: As the prosecution case of rape of minor of unsound mind suffers from inherent inconsistencies and flaws, hence, acquittal of respondent-accused by courts below, stands confirmed. [State of M.P. v. Keshar Singh, (2015) 9 SCC 91]

• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — S. 166 — Compensation/Damages: As divergent opinions were reflected in Rajesh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 and Reshma Kumari, (2013) 9 SCC 65, regarding addition of income for future prospects vis-à-vis persons who are self-employed or on fixed wages, for compensation, matter referred to larger Bench. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa, (2015) 9 SCC 166]

• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — S. 166 — Age: Since deceased had completed only 45 yrs at the time of accident, age for purposes of award of compensation under 1988 Act to be taken as 45 yrs. [Shashikala v. Gangalakshmamma, (2015) 9 SCC 150]

• Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Ss. 20 and 28(1) — Conditional self-operative decree: As there was non-compliance with conditions of decree, automatic/Deemed dismissal of suit as per terms of decree, proper. [P.R. Yelumalai v. N.M. Ravi, (2015) 9 SCC 52]

• Labour Law — Regularisation — Entitlement to regularisation — Employer-employee relationship: For entitlement to regularization, determination of employer-employee relationship is a prerequisite. Status of respondent workers i.e. whether they were engaged by contractor or were engaged directly by appellant Food Corporation of India (FCI) as casual workers needs to be established based on cogent material, before question of regularisation can be considered. Question of regularisation to be decided thereafter as per law. [FCI v. Sankar Ghosh, (2015) 9 SCC 104]

• Arms Act, 1959 — Ss. 7, 20, 23, 25, 27 and 30 — Applicability of 1959 Act: Recovery of large quantity of unlicensed and unauthorised arms and ammunition from crew members of foreign vessel intercepted in Indian territorial waters, attracts provisions of Arms Act for initiating prosecution. [State of T.N. v. Mariya Anton Vijay, (2015) 9 SCC 294]

• Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (Determination of Network Tariff for City or Local Natural Gas Distribution Networks and Compression Charge for CNG) Regulations, 2008 — Regns. 3 and 4 — Validity: Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (Determination of Network Tariff for City or Local Natural Gas Distribution Networks and Compression Charge for CNG) Regulations, 2008 purportedly made under S. 22 of 2006 Act are ultra vires parent Act (Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006) since parent statute does not empower Board to fix any tariff of a consumer of natural gas. [Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board v. Indraprastha Gas Ltd., (2015) 9 SCC 209]

• Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 227, 228 and 319 — Discharge: Remedy of discharge is not applicable in case of accused summoned under S. 319. Standard of proof employed for summoning a person as an accused under S. 319 CrPC, is higher than the standard of proof employed for framing a charge against an accused. Thus, it does not stand to reason that a person who is summoned as an accused to stand trial and added as such to the proceedings on basis of a stricter standard of proof can be allowed to be discharged from the proceedings on the basis of a lesser standard of proof such as a prima facie connection with the offence necessary for charging the accused. [Jogendra Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2015) 9 SCC 244]

• Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 22 R. 10 — Continuance of suit against person on whom interest in suit property devolves during pendency of suit: Where the interest in the suit property has devolved upon the second defendant on the basis of the alleged gift deed, the suit may be continued against such second defendant. For the sake of continuance of the suit against the persons upon whom such interest has devolved during the pendency of the suit, leave of the court has to be obtained. Leave can be obtained only by that person upon whom interest has devolved during the pendency of the suit, otherwise, there may be preposterous results, as such a party might be unaware of the pending litigation and the same would not be consequently feasible. If a duty is cast upon him then in such an eventuality he is bound by the decree even in case of failure to apply for leave. Therefore, as a rule of prudence, the initial duty lies upon the person on whom such an interest has devolved upon any such property to apply for leave of the court in case the factum of devolution was within his knowledge or with due diligence could have been known by him. [Kirpal Kaur v. Jitender Pal Singh, (2015) 9 SCC 356]

• Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 12 R. 6 — Power under — Nature of and Considerations for exercise of: Expression “may” suggests power of court under Or. 12 R. 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right. Where defendants raised objections which go to root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise discretion under Or. 12 R. 6 CPC. [S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287]

• Armed Forces — Disability Pension — Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 — R. 12, Notes 1 & 2 r/w Regn. 173, Pension Regulations of the Army, 1961 — “On duty”: In terms of R. 12, disability sustained during course of accident which occurs when personnel of armed forces is strictly not on duty may also be attributable to military service on fulfilling conditions enumerated therein provided there is reasonable causal connection between injuries resulting in disability and military service. In this case, respondent sustained multiple fracture injuries when he lost balance while climbing stairs to get to roof of his sister’s house to have a smoke, during annual leave, hence held, his injuries were accidental in nature. Respondent’s act of going towards roof to have a smoke, and falling down by no stretch of imagination can be attributed to military service since he was not “on duty” then. Thus, judgment finding that respondent was entitled to disability pension, unsustainable. [Union of India v. Vijay Kumar No. 3989606 P, Ex-Naik, (2015) 10 SCC 460]

• W.B. Kerosene Control Order, 1968 — Paras 9, 5, 6, 3(a), (c) and (e) — Competent authority to issue show-cause notice or to suspend licence of agent or dealer: Expression “the Director of Consumer Goods or the District Magistrate” in Para 9 does not confer concurrent jurisdiction on both these authorities to issue show-cause notice or to suspend or cancel licence of agent or dealer. Director as defined in Para 3(d), who alone is authorized under Para 5 to grant licence to agent, alone has power to issue show-cause notice to, or suspend or cancel licence of agent under Para 9. Director as defined in Para 3(d), or District Magistrate, as defined in Para 3(e), who are both authorised under Para 6 to grant licence to dealer, both have power to issue show-cause notice to, or suspend or cancel licence of dealer.  This interpretation is based on principle that authority granting licence has authority to cancel the same. [State of W.B. v. R.K.B.K. Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 369]

• Town Planning — Town Planning Scheme — Validity of — Kamal Vihar Township Development Scheme No. 4 (KVTDS): Subsequent expansion, land acquisition, change in land use and reconstruction of land arbitrarily and illegally by incompetent authorities by blatant violation of legal and environmental procedure depriving constitutional right of landowners, is impermissible. Thus subsequent expansion of town planning scheme and resultant acquisition of land of appellant landowners, set aside. [Rajendra Shankar Shukla v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2015) 10 SCC 400]

• Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 304-A, 337, 338 and 36 — Criminal negligence causing death [S. 304-A IPC] or endangering human life or safety causing hurt/Grievous hurt [Ss. 337/338 IPC]/Negligence: In Uphaar Cinema case, considering the old age and health conditions of appellants, fine of Rs 30 crores imposed on each A-1 and A-2 (owners of Uphaar Cinema) in lieu of their remaining period of sentence. [Sushil Ansal v. State, (2015) 10 SCC 359]

• Penal Code, 1860 — S. 306 r/w S. 114 and S. 498-A — Cruelty — Abetment to commit suicide: In this case, cruelty, torture and harassment for dowry proved, but cause of death being accidental consumption of poisonous tablets, appellants mother-in-law and sister-in-law of deceased acquitted under S. 306 but conviction under S. 498-A, confirmed. [Bhanuben v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 10 SCC 390]

• Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 — Ss. 28 to 30, 3, 32, 40 to 42 and 2(11): As land was acquired by State for KIADB for purpose of establishment of industries, which in turn allotted/leased it to Company (M/s Ultra Tech Cement Ltd.), Company in the facts of the present case was not a beneficiary or “person interested” in terms of S. 2(11), KIAD Act or S. 3(b), LA Act. Hence, it had no right to participate in award proceedings for determination of market value. Further held, beneficiary in instant case was KIADB. [Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 469]

• General Clauses Act, 1897 — Ss. 6, 6-A and 24 — Repeal — What is — Manner and form required: Repeals may take any form and so long as a statute or part of it is obliterated, such obliteration would be covered by the expression “repeal”. Thus, even an implied repeal of a statute would fall within the expression “repeal” in S. 6-A GCA, and reading of S. 6-A GCA would show that a repeal can be by way of an express omission. This being the case, the word “repeal” in both Ss. 6 and 24 GCA, would therefore, include repeals by express omission. Thus, omission of S. 280-ZA r/w S. 280-Y(d), IT Act, 1961 and its re-enactment with modification in S. 54-G, IT Act, 1961would come within operation of S. 24 GCA and the notifications issued under S. 280-ZA r/w S. 280-Y(d) would continue for the purposes of S. 54-G, IT Act, 1961. [Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333]

• Excise — Valuation — Expenses towards freight, insurance and unloading charges, etc. — When to be included in the valuation of the goods for the purposes of excise duty: “Place of removal” is the place or premises from where the excisable goods are to be sold after their clearance from the factory and from where such goods are removed. “Place of removal”, in a given case becomes a crucial determinative factor for the purpose of valuation. If it is found that transportation charges and transit insurance charges were incurred after the “place of removal”, then they are not to be included. On the other hand, if these charges are incurred before the “place of removal” then they are to be included while arriving at the transaction value. [CCE v. EMCO Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 321]

• Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 37 R. 3 — Summary suit — Leave to Defend: Where the defendant has raised a triable issue or a reasonable defence, the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. Leave is granted to defend even in cases where the defendant upon disclosing a fact, though lacks the defence but makes a positive impression that at the trial the defence would be established to the plaintiff’s claim. Furthermore, leave to defend the summons for judgment shall always be granted to the defendant when there is a triable issue as to the meaning or correctness of the documents on which the claim is based or the alleged facts are of such nature which entitle the defendant to interrogate or cross-examine the plaintiff or his witnesses. [State Bank of Hyderabad v. Rabo Bank, (2015) 10 SCC 521]

• Penal Code, 1860 — S. 307 or S. 325 r/w S. 320 Seventhly — Injury in question if “grievous hurt”: To make out the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, there must be a specific hurt voluntarily inflicted and coming within the eight kinds of hurt enumerated in Section 320 IPC. As PW 2 sustained fracture or dislocation of frontal bone of skull caused by appellant during sudden fight which clearly falls in the category of “grievous hurt” as expressly mentioned in clause Seventhly of S. 320. Even though doctor was not questioned about nature of injuries, fracture of the frontal bone would bring the offence within the definition of “grievous hurt”. Hence, High Court rightly convicted the appellant under S. 325 instead of under S. 307. However, as the occurrence was a sudden fight and in a fit of passion, appellant inflicted injuries on PW 2, sentence of imprisonment of 7 yrs is excessive and is reduced to 3 yrs. [Sakharam v. State of M.P., (2015) 10 SCC 557]

• Succession Act, 1925 — Ss. 61 to 63, 70, 73 and 372 — Multiple wills: In this case where succession certificate was granted to R-1, adopted son of testator on basis of will dt. 15-11-1978 which superseded two wills, as there were no vitiating or suspicious circumstances invalidating bequest and execution of lattermost will and the attestation thereof by two witnesses, as required in law was satisfactorily proved, and signature of the testator, on these documents has been endorsed by both the handwriting experts. Also, the report of the forensic science laboratory also corroborates this finding, hence, it was rightly found by High Court that dispensation made by testator in favour of R-1 could not be repudiated to be in defiance of logic or unfair vis-à-vis other members of family. [Shakuntala Bai v. Mahaveer Prasad, (2015) 10 SCC 550]

• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Compensation — Permanent partial disability: Compensation enhanced to Rs 15,97,400, in this case where a professional driver has suffered 100% permanent disability with regard to his earning capacity in the accident. [Rajan v. Soly Sebastian, (2015) 10 SCC 506]

• Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975 (7 of 1975) — Ss. 5-A, 2(e), 2(k) proviso and Expln. 2 to S. 2(e): Imposition of luxury tax on entire building by clubbing plinth area of all residential apartments owned by different persons and computing tax treating the same as singular building, not proper. In terms of Expln. 2 to S. 2(e) when a building consists of different apartments/flats owned by different persons and cost of building is met by all of them, each apartment/flat is deemed to be separate building. Further held, Expln. 2 to S. 2(e) should not be read as negative provision, detrimental and fatal to cases where there are separate owners since it is a benevolent and beneficial provision. Hence, matter remanded to Revenue Authority to recompute luxury tax accordingly. [State of Kerala v. A.P. Mammikutty, (2015) 10 SCC 632]

• Income Tax — Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) — Rate applicable — S. 194-I or S. 194-C of IT Act — Applicability: Landing, parking and take-off facilities provided under an agreement and/or arrangement with Airports Authority of India, such facilities are not “use of land” for which “rent” is to be paid. As the facility was not of “use of land” per se but charges on landing and take-off and other air traffic services by AAI from airlines were in respect of number of facilities provided by AAI which was to be necessarily provided in compliance with various international protocols. Charges were for various services provided and not for land usage or area allotted simpliciter. In view of compulsorily providing these facilities, “use of land” pails into insignificance and becomes incidental. Such charges are not dependent upon use of the land, hence, such charges cannot be treated as “rent” within the meaning of S. 194-I of 1961 Act. Hence, TDS @ 2% as provided in S. 194-C would be deducted on such charges. [Japan Airlines Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 591]

• Income Tax — Concession/Exemption/Incentive/Rebate: Exemption notification No. GSR 307(E) dt. 31-3-1983 granting exemption in respect of surtax in favour of foreign companies with whom Central Government had executed agreements for direct association or participation by Central Government or persons authorised by it (such as ONGC) in prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils, confines or restricts scope of exemption to only one category of foreign companies which has been specifically enumerated in S. 24-AA(2)(a) of 1964 Act. Second category of foreign companies that may be providing services as enumerated in S. 24-AA(2)(b) of 1964 Act is specifically omitted in the exemption notification. Omission of this particular category of foreign companies in exemption notification, notwithstanding wide amplitude and availability of power under S. 24-AA of 1964 Act, clearly reflects a conscious decision on part of Central Government to confine scope of exemption notification to only those foreign companies that are enumerated in and covered by S. 24-AA(2)(a) of 1964 Act. If out of the two limbs where the power of exemption was intended to operate, the repository of the power i.e. the Central Government, had consciously chosen to grant exemption in one particular field i.e. foreign companies covered by S. 24-AA(2)(a) of 1964 Act, the scope of the grant cannot be enhanced or expanded by a judicial pronouncement. [ONGC v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 621]

• Excise — Classification of goods — Dental cleaner or toothpaste: As the ingredients and ratio of all the inputs which go into the manufacturing of a toothpaste and dental cleaner found different and varying and the dental cleaner, found to have in addition, two more ingredients, namely, silicon agglomerate and bluer agglomerates. Also, the manufacturing process of Closeup toothpaste and Close-up Whitening, products of the same company, found to be different; stages of manufacture and time taken to manufacture also found to be different and expert witness, explaining the differences in the products, opined that Close-up Whitening dental cleaner cannot be equated with toothpaste, hence, in light of these factors, Closeup Whitening held not to be a toothpaste but a dental cleaner, to be classified under Sub-Heading 3306.90. [CCE v. Global Health Care Products Partnership Firm, (2015) 10 SCC 513]

• Excise — Appeal — Appeal to Tribunal — Pre-deposit: Restoration of appeal which had been dismissed for non-deposit of, after such dismissal had attained finality. However, clarified that all contentions of both parties are left open and present order not to be treated as precedent in any other case. [Kisaan Gramodyog Sansthan v. CCE, (2015) 10 SCC 629]

• Customs — Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 — Demand notice: Endorsement on the bill of entry asking the assessee to pay additional customs duty, amounted to a notice of demand within S. 95(ii)(b) of 1998 Act, thereby entitling the assessee to avail benefit of Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme. [Swastika Enterprises v. Commr. of Customs, (2015) 10 SCC 573]

• Customs — Concession/Exemption/Incentive/Rebate — Exemption: Amendment of licence granted to assessee for import of goods under exemption notification, by DGFT does not take away requirement of fulfilment of conditions under the exemption notification. Since conditions of the exemption notification are not fulfilled and law requires strict compliance exemption notification, assessee becomes liable to pay import duty. [Commr. of Customs v. Pennar Industries Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 581]

• Customs — Classification of goods — Duplicating machine and printing machine: From the description of the process adopted in Risograph machine, it becomes apparent that Risograph printing process is more akin to screen printing. Hence, Risograph falls under Heading 84.43 (8443.50) and thereby exigible to duty @ 25% ad valorem, and not a “duplicating office machine” falling under Heading 84.72 (8472.90) and thereby exigible to duty @ 65%. [HCL Ltd. v. Commr. of Customs, (2015) 10 SCC 532]

• Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 220 and 223 — Enabling in nature — Joint trial: Discretion is vested with court to order joint trial. When (a) joint trial would prolong trial; (b) cause unnecessary wastage of judicial time; (c) confuse or cause prejudice to accused, who had taken part only in some minor offence, (d) neither facts and allegations are common, nor is evidence common nor were accused acting with a commonality of purpose, holding of joint trial, not obligatory. [Essar Teleholdings Ltd. v. CBI, (2015) 10 SCC 562]

• Constitution of India — Arts. 19(1)(g), 19(6) and 39(a) — Right to carry on trade and occupation from a kiosk opposite/in proximity to court premises: Security of court/premises, held, good ground to remove such vendors/kiosks from vicinity of court premises. [Dharam Chand v. New Delhi Municipal Council, (2015) 10 SCC 612]

• Constitution of India — Art. 226: As in this case suspension order passed against respondent Controller of Examinations of University alleged to have indulged in financial irregularities causing huge financial loss to University, was set aside by Single Judge of High Court but Division Bench of High Court by impugned judgment without formulating any issue for determination or examining rival submissions disposing of writ appeal by issuing directions to appellant University, though observing that “matter had become academic, if not infructuous” and yet making the order subject to any decision rendered by Single Judge, who according to Division Bench had heard and reserved matter for pronouncement of final orders, hence, matter remitted for afresh decision. [North Bengal University v. Dilip Kumar Sarkar, (2015) 10 SCC 545]

• Constitution of India — Art. 136 — Prejudice to other/main proceedings — Interference by Supreme Court in collateral proceedings (contempt proceedings) pending adjudication upon main issue: When the issue on merits was seized of by the original court in civil suit and rights of the parties were still not decided, it would not be proper for Supreme Court to probe into facts and record any finding on any of the issues arising out of collateral proceedings i.e. contempt proceedings initiated by High Court without first disposing of interim application. Any observation by Supreme Court in such proceedings might cause prejudice to parties while prosecuting their case before original court. [Quantum Securities (P) Ltd. v. New Delhi Television Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 602]

• Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 39 R. 2-A and S. 122 — Interim injunction order passed by High Court under Or. 39 Rr. 1 and 2 CPC — Breach of: S. 22 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides that right to proceed under said Act is an additional right.  Besides, power of High Court in respect of contempt stems not only from Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 but also from Art. 215 of Constitution of India. Said power under Art. 215 cannot be abridged or abrogated or cut down or controlled or limited by any statute or rules or provision of CPC. Further, in view of S. 122 CPC, in case of any conflict between provisions of CPC and Rules framed by High Court, the latter will prevail. In present case, relevant High Court Rules prescribing specific procedure for dealing with cases under Contempt of Courts Act. Provisions of Or. 39 R. 2-A CPC cannot override said Rules. Hence, dismissal of contempt petition by High Court on ground that in view of specific remedy being available under Or. 39 R. 2-A CPC to meet the contingency of breach of injunction orders, person complaining of breach of injunction order should not be allowed to take up proceedings under Contempt of Courts Act, was not proper. [Welset Eegineers v. Vikas Auto Industries, (2015) 10 SCC 609]

• Central Excise Rules, 1944 — Rr. 173-G, 9 and 49 — CENVAT Credit: Payment of duty through CENVAT Credit is as good as making payment through account current [prior to amendment of R. 8 of 2002 Rules inserting of sub-rule (3-A) vide Notification No. 17/05-C.E.(N.T.) dt. 31-3-2005 w.e.f. 1-4-2005]. Utilisation of CENVAT Credit, when facility for payment of duty fortnightly under R. 173-G is suspended, permissible. [Jayaswal Neco Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 10 SCC 651]

• Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 — Ss. 36-A and 36-D — Unfair trade practice — What is: The definition of “unfair trade practice” in S. 36-A is not inclusive or flexible, but specific and limited in its contents. Conclusions based only upon subjective considerations of fairness do not pass the objective test of law in view of the precise definitions under S. 36-A. There is no scope to pass an order under S. 36-D(1) of the Act when no case of any unfair trade practice as defined under S. 36-A, is made out. [TELCO Ltd. v. MRTP Commission, (2015) 10 SCC 734]

• Gujarat Stamp Act, 1958 (60 of 1958) — Ss. 4, 5 and 6 — Instruments relating to several distinct matters or distinct transactions: Instrument containing or relating to several distinct matters is to be separately charged, as if it were a separate instrument. Indenture of mortgage entered into between borrower and lead trustee appointed by consortium of lending banks pertaining to separate loan agreements entered into with each bank, comprises several “distinct matters”/distinct transactions falling under S. 5 of the Act, when the mortgage deed was executed as a consequence of financial assistance secured from said consortium of lending banks. [Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Coastal Gujarat Power Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 700]

• Factories Act, 1948 — Ss. 46, 2(m) and 2(n) — Statutory canteen: Subject canteen located within precincts of Divisional Railway Manager Office (DRM Office), Moradabad Division since 1940, catering to more than 500 employees, and under direct control and supervision of DRM, is a statutory canteen. [Mohan Singh v. Railway Board, (2015) 10 SCC 759]

• Excise — Valuation — Cash discounts offered to buyers of assessee: S. 4 of Central Excise Act, 1944 as amended in 2000 introduced the concept of “transaction value” so that on each removal of excisable goods, the “transaction value” of such goods becomes determinable. Value of the excisable goods even on the basis of “transaction value” has only to be at the time of removal, that is, the time of clearance of the goods. The expression “price actually paid or payable for the goods, when sold” in definition of “transaction value in S. 4(3)(d) as it stood after 2000 amendment only means that whatever is agreed to as the price for the goods forms the basis of value, whether such price has been paid, has been paid in part, or has not been paid at all. The expression “when sold” is not meant to indicate the time at which such goods are sold, but is meant to indicate that goods are the subject-matter of an agreement of sale. Cash discount is something which is “known” at or prior to the clearance of the goods, being contained in the agreement of sale between the assessee and its buyers, and must therefore be deducted from the sale price in order to arrive at the value of excisable goods “at the time of removal”. [Purolator India Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 10 SCC 715]

• Excise — Valuation — Additional consideration: Duty drawback received from Government, arising out of transfer of advance import licence in favour of assessee seller by buyer can be treated as additional consideration for the purpose of arriving at “transaction value”. Implication of R. 6 of 2000 Rules is that any form of additional consideration which flows from the buyer to the assessee, monetary value thereof is to be included while arriving at the transaction value. Even indirect consideration is includible in transaction value. Additional monetary consideration, in addition to the price being paid for the goods i.e. transfer of advance import licence in favour of the assessee seller by the buyer enabling the assessee seller of the goods to effect duty-free import of the raw materials and bringing down the cost of production/procurement, is a consideration, the monetary value of which has to be added to valuation under R. 6 of 2000 Rules. [CCE v. Indorama Synthetics (I) Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 793]

• Excise — Concession/Exemption/Incentive/Rebate/Subsidy — Exemption — Power to grant exemption: Benefit of exemption is to be extended to all similarly situated persons and Government cannot create sub-classification excluding one sub-category, even when both sub-categories are of the same genus.  Judicial review of such notifications is permissible in order to undertake the scrutiny as to whether the notification results in invidious discrimination between two persons though they belong to the same class. Classification of assessees into two categories on the basis of method adopted by the assessees for payment of customs duty and grant of different exemption benefits on the basis of such classification, not permissible. [Union of India v. N.S. Rathnam & Sons, (2015) 10 SCC 681]

• Excise — Concession/Exemption/Incentive/Rebate/Subsidy — Exemption Notification No. 22/94-CE dt. 1-3-1994: Paper manufactured out of pulp of jute bags/gunny bags is not paper manufactured from “rags”. Thus, eligible for availing the benefit of concessional duty under the impugned notification, when the notification specifically excluded benefit to paper manufactured from rags. [Coastal Paper Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 10 SCC 664]

• Excise — Classification of goods — Medicament or cosmetic — Determination of: Essential character of the product in question is to be kept in mind for ascertaining whether it would be a cosmetic or a drug i.e. whether curative/prophylactic value is primary in nature or not. Vaseline Intensive Care Heel Guard (VHG), marketed as a solution for cracked heels, is not a skin care preparation classifiable under Chapter Heading 3304.00 but a patent/proprietary medicament classifiable under Chapter Heading 3003.10. [CCE v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 742]

• Contract and Specific Relief — Contractual Obligations and Rights — Privity and Third parties’ obligations and rights: As contract was entered into between company ONGC (awarder/employer) and company HSL (head contractor) regarding certain work to be carried out by HSL for ONGC and there was engagement of a sub-contractor (i.e. EOL), in terms of the above contract, by HSL to get the said work done, claim of payment by sub-contractor EOL for the work done, against ONGC, not sustainable. [Essar Oil Ltd. v. Hindustan Shipyard Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 642]

• Constitution of India — Art. 265 — Dead person’s estate — When may be taxed: To tax the dead is a contradiction in terms. Tax laws are made by the living to tax the living. What survives the dead person is what is left behind in the form of such person’s property. A dead person’s property, in the form of his or her estate, cannot be taxed without the necessary machinery provisions in tax statute concerned. Recovery of duty assessed against dead sole proprietor/manufacturer from legal representatives/estate of deceased assessee, not proper. Legal representatives are not liable to pay duty and other sums assessed against deceased assessee. [Shabina Abraham v. CCE & Customs, (2015) 10 SCC 770]