Skip to main content

High courts differ on DRT jurisdiction - Enforce also through RDDB - Section 16 of CPC not applicable

                                                                   
             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
                WRIT PETITION NO.73 OF 2014
GSL (India) Ltd.                                       ... Petitioner
         v/s
    Asset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd. ... Respondents

46. We have carefully perused the reasoning of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Amish Jain1 and with the great respect and utmost humility, we are unable to agree with the view expressed therein. Firstly, we are unable to agree with the finding of the Delhi High Court that the proceedings referred to in section 19(1) of the RDDB Act are merely proceedings for recovery of debt and not for enforcement of mortgage. According to us, this finding runs counter to the very definition of the word "debt" appearing in section 2(g) of the RDDB Act to inter alia mean any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a Bank or a Financial Institution during the course of any business activity undertaken by it under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the Application. We are therefore clearly of the view that proceedings under section 19(1) of the RDDB Act are not merely proceedings for recovery of debt. In proceedings under section 19(1) of the RDDB Act, the Bank / Financial Institution can certainly seek reliefs for enforcement of its mortgage. This interpretation would 1 2013 (1) D.R.T.C. 70 (Delhi) VRD 50 of 53 WP 73 of 14.doc also be in consonance with the purpose and object of the RDDB Act.

Secondly, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the Delhi High Court that under section 19(23) of the RDDB Act, the DRT is required to send a copy of the Recovery Certificate for execution to the DRT within whose jurisdiction the property is situated. As mentioned earlier, section 19(23) clearly stipulates that where the tribunal, which has issued a certificate of recovery, is satisfied that the property is situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction of two or more tribunals, it may send copies of the Recovery Certificate for execution to such other tribunals where the property is situated. The word "may" clearly indicates that this provision is discretionary and not mandatory in nature. Under section 19(23), discretion is given to the DRT to either itself execute the Recovery Certificate issued by it against a property not within its jurisdiction, or to send it to the concerned DRT where the property is situated.

This is a distinct departure from the provisions of the CPC and more particularly section 39 thereof. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Tushar P. Shah3 has taken this view and we are in full agreement with the reasoning contained therein.

47. We are also unable to agree with the Delhi High Court 3 2012 (6) Bom.C.R. 200 VRD 51 of 53 WP 73 of 14.doc judgment that in the RDDB Act, there is no mention of mortgage and an application under section 19(1) thereof is required to only specify the properties required to be attthrough ached and which may not necessarily be the mortgaged property. Section 2(g) of the RDDB Act and which defines the word "debt" would certainly take within its sweep a relief for enforcement of mortgage. For the foregoing reasons and in view of what we have held earlier in this judgment, we are unable to agree with the view of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Amish Jain.1

48. In view of our discussion earlier in this judgment, we hold that the DRT whilst deciding whether it has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a Securitisation Application filed under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act would be guided by the principles enshrined in section 19(1) of the RDDB Act and not by section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Rule is accordingly made absolute and the Petition is granted in terms of prayer clause (a).

Securitisation Application No.136 of 2011 is restored to the file of the DRT - III, Mumbai, to be decided on merits and in accordance with law. We would request the DRT to dispose of the Securitisation Application as expeditiously as possible and in any event, within a 1 2013 (1) D.R.T.C. 70 (Delhi) VRD 52 of 53 WP 73 of 14.doc period of three months from today. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

MACT - Permanent disability - calculate - compensation - Supreme Court - Part 2

1) C. K. Subramonia Iyer vs. T. Kunhikuttan Nair - AIR 1970 SC 376 2) R. D. Hattangadi vs. Pest Control (India) Ltd. - 1995 (1) SCC 551 3) Baker vs. Willoughby - 1970 AC 467 4) Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co.Ltd. - 2010(10) SCALE 298 5) Yadava Kumar v. D.M., National Insurance Co. Ltd. - 2010 (8) SCALE 567) 5. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following : Pecuniary damages (Special Damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure. (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising : (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General Damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. (v) Loss of ...

SARFAESI-Right of tenant/lessee - Supreme Court

Cited: 1)  M/s Trade Well, a Proprietorship Firm, Mumbai & Anr. v. Indian Bank & Anr. [2007 CRI. L.J. 2544]   2)  C.B. Gautam v. Union of India & Ors. [(1993) 1 SCC 78] 3)  ICICI Bank Ltd. v. SIDCO Leathers Ltd. & Ors. [(2006) 10 SCC 452] 4) D elhi High Court in Shri Sanjeev Bansal v. Oman International Bank SAOG & Anr. 131 (2006) DLT 729  5) Madras High Court in Sree Lakshmi Products v. State Bank of India (AIR 2007 Madras 148) 6)  Sunita Jugalkishore Gilda v. Ramalal Udhoji Tanna (dead) through LRs. & Ors. [(2013) 10 SCC 258], Supreme Court 7)  Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala and Others [(2009) 4 SCC 94], Supreme Court  8) Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank and Another v. Ashok Saw Mill [(2009) 8 SCC 366] , Supreme Court 9) United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon & Others [(2010) 8 SCC 110] , Supreme Court   10)  Oriental Bank of Commerce in Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) ...

An order of attachment before judgment ends if a suit is dismissed

An order of attachment before judgment passed under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code will not survive the dismissal of a suit and it ends when the suit is dismissed after trial. Contents 1 (i) Whether an order of attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the Code”, for short) made in a suit for recovery of money will survive the dismissal of the suit on merits? 2 (ii) If the appellate court reverses the decree of the trial court and allows the suit claim, will it result in an automatic revival of the order of attachment before judgment? 3 (iii) Whether the ratio in the decision by Full Bench in Thampi Muhammad Abdul Kadir v. Padmanabha Pillai Parameswaran Pillai (1952 KLT 264) holds good in view of the change in the precedential law and insertion of Order XXXVIII Rule 11A to the Code? 3.1 “11A. Provisions applicable to attachment.- 3.2 “57. Determination of attachment.- 3.3 Arumuhom Ammal v. Nayanar Panicker (1962 KLT 264) 3.4...