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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 5225 OF 2008
KSL & INDUSTRIES LTD. …. APPELLANT
VERSUS
M/S ARIHANT THREADS LTD. & ORS. …. RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
S. A. BOBDE, J.
1. This appeal is placed before us by way of a
reference, made by a two-Judge Bench of this Court, C.K.
Thakker and Altamas Kabir, JJ. which heard the matter on
an earlier occasion and held that the appeal deserves to be
allowed and that the Judgment and Order passed by the
High Court is liable to be set aside. In view of a difference
of opinion having arisen on the interpretation of Section 34
of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the
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`RDDB' Act) the matter has been referred for decision to
this Bench by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India.
2. The present appeal is preferred by KSL & Industries
Ltd. (`appellant' for short) against the final Judgment and
Order dated 23.02.06 passed by the Delhi High Court in
Writ Petition Nos. 2041-2042 OF 2006. The High Court set
aside the Order passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate
Tribunal, Delhi (`DRAT' for short) and held that in view of
the bar contained in Section 22 of the Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereafter
referred to as `SICA') no recovery proceedings could be
effected against Respondent No. 1 (M/s. Arihant Threads
Ltd.) (‘Company' for short).
3. The Company set up an export oriented spinning unit
for manufacturing cotton yarn in Amritsar District, in the
State of Punjab. The Company took on lease, Plot No. 454
in 1992 for a period of 99 years from Goindwal Sahib
Industrial & Investment Corporation, on a condition that it
would not transfer the interest in the property for the first
fifteen years without prior permission of the lessor. The
Company had a right to mortgage lease-hold rights to a
Bank, the Punjab Financial Corporation or the Life
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Insurance Corporation of India as security for a loan. It
got its project financed by the Industrial Development
Bank of India (`IDBI' for short) by way of foreign currency
loan and a working capital of Rs. 93.1 million.
4. Since the Company failed to repay loan installments,
IDBI filed Original Application No. 1368 of 2001 on
December 20.12.01 in Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh
(`DRT' for short) for recovery of Rs. 25,26,60,836/- under
the RDDB Act. In the proceedings before the DRT the
Company remained absent, although, duly served. On
15.07.03, an ex-parte final order in favour of IDBI for
recovery of above mentioned sum i.e. Rs. 25,26,60,836/-
along with interest @ 7.8% p.a. was passed by DRT. DRT
expressly directed that in the event of failure on the part of
the Company to pay the decretal amount, IDBI will be
entitled to sell the mortgaged property of the company and
recover the amount. If the amount remained unrecovered
even then, it shall be recovered from the sale of personal
properties of the defendants therein.
5. On 09.09.03, the Recovery Officer issued a
composite demand notice under Rule 2 of Second Schedule
of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the Company
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demanding payment of Rs. 28,60,87,384/-. He directed
the Company to appear for settling terms and conditions of
the proclamation of sale and for disclosure of its movable
and immovable assets.
6. On 16.09.04, the Recovery Officer fixed the reserve
price of the movable and immovable properties at
Rs. 12.50 crores. On 18.10.04, the Company filed an
appeal under Section 30 of the RDDB Act against the order
dated 16.09.04 fixing reserve price of the movable and
immovable properties at Rs. 12.50 crores. On 30.10.04,
the appellant was declared the highest bidder at Rs. 12.52
crores and was thus successful. On 15.12.04, the Company
moved an application for setting aside the ex-parte final
order, passed on 15.07.03 by DRT Chandigarh in favour of
IDBI, directing recovery of Rs. 25,26,60,836/- along with
interest @ 7.8% p.a. The appellant, who had become the
auction-purchaser of the company’s properties objected to
the prayer of the Company for setting aside the ex-parte
order and applied for impleadment. Meanwhile, the
Company got its property valued by Himachal Consultancy
Organisation Ltd. The realizable value of the company’s
property had been valued at Rs. 20.22 crores.
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7. On 26.07.05, DRT-I, Delhi allowed the Company’s
appeal filed under Section 30 of the RDDB Act against
fixation of reserve price at Rs. 12.50 crores. DRT-I, Delhi,
set aside the auction sale subject to payment of a certain
amount, interest, expenses, etc.
8. Objecting to these conditions, the Company filed an
appeal to the DRAT, Delhi. The appellant also filed an
appeal being aggrieved by the setting aside of the sale in
its favour. The DRAT stayed the order dated 26.07.05 by
which the ex-parte order against the Company was set
aside and directed refund of sale amount to the appellant.
9. On 21.12.05, the Company invoked the provisions of
SICA. It filed a Reference before the Board of Industrial
Finance & Reconstruction (`BIFR' for short). On 10.02.06,
the DRAT dismissed the appeal filed by the Company and
allowed the appeal of the appellant. The DRAT confirmed
auction-sale in favour of the appellant on depositing the
sale price. The DRAT directed that steps to handover
possession of the property to the auction-purchaser
(appellant) be taken by the Recovery Officer and the
appellant shall deposit the entire amount.
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10. Before the formalities directed by the DRAT could be
completed, the Company filed two Writ Petitions before the
Delhi High Court against the order of the DRAT, Delhi. The
Delhi High Court allowed the Writ Petitions vide impugned
order dated 23.02.06 and set aside the order passed by
the DRAT, Delhi on the ground that in view of the bar of
Section 22 of the SICA, the recovery proceedings could not
be pursued against the Company and no order ought to
have been passed by the DRAT, Delhi.
11. Subsequent to the order of the High Court, the BIFR
rejected the Reference of the Company and the Company
preferred an appeal, which is pending before the Appellate
Authority for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR).
The second Reference has also been filed by the Company
which has been registered as BIFR Case No. 18 of 2006, in
which the Company has been declared as a `sick
Company' and respondent No. 5 [Stressed Assets
Stablization Fund, Mumbai] has been appointed as
Operating Agency to prepare Rehabilitation Scheme.
12. As stated earlier, the matter was earlier heard by a
two Judge Bench of this Court. One of the learned Judges,
Thakker, J. held that the provisions of RDDB Act should be
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given priority and primacy over SICA by virtue of Section
34 of the RDDB Act as it is a subsequent enactment.
Therefore it may be presumed even in the absence of any
specific provision, that Parliament was aware of all the
statutes enacted prior thereto; that the non-obstante
clause had been inserted to ensure expeditious
adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and
financial institutions. Thakker, J. also held that in view of
sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the RDDB Act, which
provides that the provisions of the Act are “in addition to
and not in derogation of” inter alia SICA, which is an
additional factor why the RDDB Act shall prevail. Kabir, J.
as His Lordship then was, held that the non-obstante
clause in Section 34(1) contains an exception, to be found
in sub-section (2). Sub-section (2) provides that the Act
shall be in addition to and not in derogation of inter alia
the SICA. Further, that the overriding effect of RDDB Act
would have an overriding effect over other enactments but
supplemental to the provisions of SICA, and therefore, the
provisions of SICA would prevail over the provisions of the
RDDB Act.
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13. Kabir, J. further held that since the proceedings for
recovery had long been over, before the Company invoked
provisions of the SICA Act, the Company would therefore
not be entitled to any relief before the High Court.
14. Kabir, J. referred to the following facts for drawing
this conclusion. It was only on 21.12.05, that the Company
filed a Reference before the BIFR which was dismissed on
10.02.06. Before this, the Recovery Officer had issued a
demand notice under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule to the
Income Tax Act, 1961 demanding payment of
Rs. 28,60,87,384/-, as directed by the DRT, Chandigarh in
the final order. Thereafter, several events had taken place,
such as, on 27.10.2004, DRT allowed the auction sale
proceedings but directed it should not be confirmed; on
30.10.04, the appellant was declared to be the highest
bidder and had deposited the entire sale price on
11.11.04; in the appeal under Section 30 of the RDDB Act,
the Company moved an application for setting aside the
ex-parte order against fixation of reserve price and this
appeal was allowed on 26.07.2005 subject to fulfillment of
certain terms and conditions. It was observed that the
appeal filed by the Company was only against fixation of
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the reserve price and not against the final order. The
Company had not even availed of an appeal under Section
20 of the RDDB Act or for setting aside the sale under Rule
60 of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961
but only chose the path for having the auction-sale set
aside on the ground that the reserve price of the
Company’s assets had not been correctly fixed. In effect,
proceedings had been concluded in favour of the IDBI
under Section 19 of the RDDB Act long before the BIFR
came into the scene. That auction sale of the properties
under the RDDB Act was confirmed by the DRAT before the
writ petitions were allowed by the High Court.
15. The Company's first Reference was rejected by the
BIFR and only the second reference made on 15.09.06,
had been allowed i.e. after the High Court’s order dated
23.02.06. Since the recovery proceedings have been
concluded in favour of the appellant and the appellant had
also deposited the sale price, the respondent was not
entitled to any relief by virtue of Section 22 of the SICA
before the High Court.
16. In the circumstances, both the learned Judges held,
for different reasons, that the appeal deserves to be
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allowed and the Judgment and Order of the High Court is
liable to be set aside. Since, there was a difference of
opinion on the question of law, a reference was made to a
larger Bench.
SCHEME AND PURPOSE OF THE SICK INDUSTRIAL
COMPANIES (SPECIAL PROVISIONS) ACT, 1985
[SICA]
17. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, sets
out the following:
While interpreting which of the two Acts i.e. The Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 [SICA]
or the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 [RDDB Act] should prevail, in view of
the non obstante clause contained in both, one of the
important tests is the purpose of the two enactments. It is
important to recognize and ensure that the purpose of
both enactments is as far as possible, fulfilled.
18. The SICA was enacted to provide for timely
determination of a body of experts for providing
preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures
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that would need to be adopted to sick companies. The illeffects
of sickness in industrial companies such as loss of
production, loss of employment, loss of revenue to the
Central and State Governments and locking up of
investible funds of banks and financial institutions were of
serious concern to the Government and the society at
large. In order to fully utilize the productive industrial
assets, afford maximum protection of employment and
optimize the use of funds of the banks and financial
institutions, it was found imperative to revive and
rehabilitate the potentially liable sick industrial companies.
19. Multiplicity of laws and agencies made the adoption
of a coordinated approach for dealing with sick industrial
companies difficult. The Sick Industrial Companies Bill was
introduced in the Parliament to enact legislation for timely
determination of a body of experts for providing
preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures.
20. As would appear significant in the scheme of things
relevant to this matter, an important reference is made to
the “multiplicity of laws and agencies” making the adoption
of a coordinated approach for dealing with sick industrial
companies difficult.
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21. The term “sick industrial company” has been defined
to mean an industrial company (being a company
registered for not less than five years) which has at the
end of any financial year accumulated losses equal to or
exceeding its entire net worth, vide Section 3(o).
“Industrial Company” means a company which owns one
or more industrial undertakings, vide Section 3(e).
“Industrial Undertaking” has been defined to mean an
undertaking pertaining to a scheduled industry carried on
in one or more factories by any company, vide Section
3(f).
22. In effect a “sick industrial company” is a company
owning one or more industrial undertakings pertaining to a
scheduled industry as contemplated by the Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (IDRA).
23. The Act thus aims to revive and rehabilitate, not all
sick companies but those in the schedule to the IDRA,
presumably vital to the economy of the nation.
24. The Act provides for an Inquiry into whether a
company is a sick industrial company, an assessment
whether it can be made viable and the preparation and
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sanction of a scheme for inter alia the financial
reconstruction of the sick industrial company. It provides
for the proper management of the sick industrial company,
amalgamation, sale or lease of a part or whole of an
industrial undertaking of the sick company etc., vide
Sections 16, 17 and 18 of the SICA Act.
25. The Act confers wide powers on the Board to provide
in the scheme - amalgamation of the sick industrial
company with a transferee company, the alteration of the
memorandum or articles of association, reduction of the
interest or rights of the shareholders and for continuation
of legal proceedings, the sale or lease of the industrial
undertaking etc.
26. It is in this background that Section 22, which
provides for suspension of legal proceedings, is enacted.
To the extent it is relevant here, the Section reads as
under:
“ 22. SUSPENSION OF LEGAL
PROCEEDINGS, CONTRACTS, ETC.
(1) Where in respect of an industrial company,
an inquiry under Section 16 is pending, or any
scheme referred to under Section 17 is under
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preparation or consideration or a sanctioned
scheme is under implementation or where an
appeal under Section 25 relating to an
industrial company is pending, then,
notwithstanding anything contained in the
Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any other
law or the memorandum and articles of
association of the industrial company or any
other instrument having effect under the said
Act or other law, no proceedings for the
winding-up of the industrial company or for
execution, distress or the like against any of
the properties of the industrial company or for
the appointment of a receiver in respect
thereof and no suit for the recovery of money
or for the enforcement of any security against
the industrial company or of any guarantee in
respect of any loans, or advance granted to
the industrial company shall lie or be
proceeded with further, except with the
consent of the Board or, as the case may be,
the Appellate Authority.”
27. The Section is enacted against the backdrop of the
existing multitude of remedies which creditors may avail of
against an indebted company and its properties bringing
them to attachments, auction sale etc., making it difficult
for the authorities entrusted with its reconstruction under
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the SICA to evolve a scheme for reconstruction. The
Section is also given primacy by way of a non-obstante
clause vide Section 32 of SICA which reads as follows:-
“32. Effect of the Act on other laws
(1) The provisions of this Act and of any rules
or schemes made there under shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law except
the provisions of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973) and the
Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
(33 of 1976) for the time being in force or in
the Memorandum or Articles of Association of
an industrial company or in any other
instrument having effect by virtue of any law
other than this Act.
(2) Where there has been under any scheme
under this Act an amalgamation of a sick
industrial company with another company, the
provisions of Section 72A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) shall, subject to the
modifications that the power of the Central
Government under that section may be
exercised by the Board without any
recommendation by the specified authority
referred to in that section, apply in relation to
such amalgamation as they apply in relation to
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the amalgamation of a company owning an
industrial undertaking with another company.”
28. It may also be noted that the Section, along with the
SICA was enacted in 1985. At that time the remedies
which were later on provided by the RDDB Act 1993, for
recovery by a creditor through an application to the Debt
Recovery Tribunal were not in existence nor contemplated.
There is naturally no reference to such a mode of recovery
in the SICA and neither is a stay contemplated of such a
proceedings in express terms. We say this in view of the
submission advanced before us that Section 22 only
contemplates a stay of proceedings for the distress or
execution of the properties of the sick company and suits
for recovery and that therefore an application for recovery
under the RDDB Act cannot be stayed, and must proceed.
We might also observe that the consequence of accepting
the submission that Section 22 cannot affect or render
untenable an application for recovery under the RDDB Act,
would result in an anomaly. The submission is that Section
22 lays down that only proceeding for winding up or
execution, distress or the like shall not lie or be proceeded
with where an enquiry is pending or a scheme is under
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preparation or consideration or a sanction scheme is under
implementation etc.; whereas a proceeding for recovery of
a debt may proceed. To put it another way, that a
proceeding for recovery shall lie against a sick company
but an order made in it could not be executed against any
of the properties of the industrial company, the effect
being that the proceedings may continue without any
consequence. Thus there cannot be any execution or
distraint against the properties of the company but
creditors may continue to apply for recovery before the
DRT. We do not think that such an anomalous purpose can
be attributed to Parliament in the present legislative
scheme. Though there is no doubt that Parliament may
expressly bring about such a situation if it considers it
desirable. Even otherwise, it appears that the legislative
purpose for reconstruction of companies could be thwarted
if creditors are allowed to encumber the properties of the
company with decrees of the DRT while the BIFR is
engaged in reviving the company, if necessary, by leasing
or selling the properties of the company for which there is
an express power.
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29. Plainly, the purpose of laying down that no
proceedings for execution and distraint or the like or a suit
for recovery shall not lie, is to protect the properties of the
sick industrial company and the company itself from being
proceeded against by its creditors who may wish to seek
the winding up of the company or levy execution or
distress against its properties. It protects the company
from all such proceedings. It also protects the company
from suits for recovery of money or for the enforcement of
any security or of any guarantee in respect of any loans, or
advances granted to the industrial company. But as is
apparent, the immunity is not absolute. Such proceeding
which a creditor may wish to institute, may be instituted or
continued with the consent of the Board or the Appellate
Authority. In the Section as originally enacted, the words
“and no suit for the recovery of money or for
the enforcement of any security ……………” were not there.
These words appear to have been inserted to expressly
provide, rather clarify that no suits for the recovery of
money etc. would lie or be proceeded with against such a
company.
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30. At this juncture, it would apposite to notice the
judgment of this Court in Kailash Nath Agarwal and Ors.
Vs. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P.
Ltd. & Anr.1, where this Court considered whether Section
22 afforded protection to guarantors of the sick company
or only to the sick company. It was contended that
Section 22 prohibits the filing of a suit for recovery of
money or for enforcement of any guarantee in respect of a
loan or advance granted to an industrial company. It was
claimed that if proceedings for recovery through a court of
law were prohibited under Section 22(1), there was no
reason that protection should be refused when action was
sought to be taken without recourse to Court. The Court
held that the words “proceedings” and “suit” had to be
construed differently as carrying different meanings,
since, they had been used to denote different things. The
Court concluded that Section 22(1) only prohibits recovery
against the industrial company and there is no protection
offered to guarantors against the recovery proceedings.
1
(2003) 4 SCC 305
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31. On the strength of this decision in Kailash Nath
Agarwal (supra) it was contended that the application for
recovery against the Company filed under the RDDB Act in
the execution of which the appellant had purchased the
property of the Company was neither a “proceeding” nor a
“suit” within the meaning of Section 22. Therefore, the
proceedings in the application for recovery remained
ineffective by Section 22. We find, however, that the
judgment in Kailash Nath Agarwal does not come to the
aid of the appellant. That judgment did not consider the
question that has arisen in this case. It dealt with the
question regarding the scope of protection afforded to
guarantors under Section 22(1) of the SICA, and held that
there was no protection afforded to guarantors as distinct
from the sick company under Section 22(1), since the
expression “suit” was used only in relation to sick industrial
companies and not to guarantors. Similarly, the
expression “proceeding” in relation to distress and
execution, was used to denote something other than a
“suit”. No such question arises in this case.
32. As observed earlier, sub-section (1) of Section 22
may be divided into two parts. In one part, it provides
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that “no proceedings” be instituted for the winding up of
the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like
against any of the properties of such industrial company,
and in the second part it provides that “no suit” for the
recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security
against the industrial company or of any guarantee in
respect of any loans or advances granted to the industrial
company, “shall lie or be proceeded with further, except
with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the
Appellate Authority.”
33. Undoubtedly, the present proceedings viz.
“application for recovery” cannot specifically be described
as proceedings for execution, distress or the like against
any of the properties, but it is certainly a proceeding which
results in and in fact had resulted in the execution and
distress against the property of the Company and is
therefore liable to be construed as a proceeding for the
execution, distress or the like against any of the properties
of the industrial company. We are of the view that such a
construction would be within the intendment of Parliament
wherever the proceedings for recovery of a debt which has
been secured by a mortgage or pledge of the property of
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the borrower are instituted. Surely, there is no purpose in
construing that Parliament intended that such an
application for recovery by summary procedure should lie
or be proceeded with, but only its execution be interdicted
or inhibited especially. In this context, it may be
remembered that the proceedings by way of an application
for recovery according to a summary procedure as
provided under the RDDB Act are not referred to in Section
22 simply because the RDDB Act had not then been
enacted.
SCHEME AND PURPOSE OF THE RECOVERY OF DEBTS
DUE TO BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT,
1993 (RDDB ACT)
34. In 1993, Parliament passed the Recovery of Debts
due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, i.e. the
RDDB Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons recited
that more than fifteen lakhs of cases filed by the public
sector banks and about 304 cases filed by the financial
institutions involving recovery of debts of more than
Rs. 5622 crores in dues of Public Sector Banks and about
Rs. 391 crores of dues of the financial institutions were
pending. The locking of such huge amounts of public
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money prevented proper utilisation and recycling of the
funds for the development of the country. The RDDB Act
was thus enacted to prevent such stagnation of huge
amounts of public money due to the existing procedure for
recovery of debts. The urgent need to work out a suitable
mechanism through which the debts of the banks and
financial institutions could be realised without delay was in
the form of Special Tribunals, which would follow summary
procedure. These Tribunals eventually came to be known
as Debt Recovery Tribunals.
35. The ‘debt’ contemplated by the RDDB Act refers to
the liability claimed as due, by a bank or a financial
institution from any person, whether secured or unsecured
or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil
court or any arbitration award or under a mortgage and
legally recoverable, vide Section 2 (g). Applications for
recovery were required to be made to a Tribunal
established under Section 3. Appeals were to lie before the
Appellate Tribunal under Section 20. Upon the adjudication
of the application/appeal by the Tribunal, the certificate of
recovery is made executable by Chapter V under
Section 25. The Recovery Officer on receipt of the copy of
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certificate is required to proceed to recover the amount of
debt specified in the certificate by attachment and sale of
the movable or immovable property of the defendant etc.,
vide Section 25. Section 18 bars the jurisdiction of any
court or any authority except the Supreme Court and a
High Court, in relation to an application for recovery of
debts due to banks and financial institutions. Section 34,
with which we are concerned, confers an overriding effect
on the RDDB Act in the following terms:
“34. Act to have overriding effect.--(1)
Save as provided under Sub-section (2), the
provisions of this Act shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law for the
time being in force or in any instrument having
effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.
(2) The provisions of this Act or the rules
made thereunder shall be in addition to, and
not in derogation of, the Industrial Finance
Corporation Act, 1948, the State Financial
Corporations Act, 1951, the Unit Trust of India
Act, 1963, the Industrial Reconstruction Bank
of India Act, 1984 and the Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and
the Small Industries Bank of India Act, 1989.”
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36. This special law, which deals with the recovery of
debts due to banks and financial institutions, makes the
procedure for recovery of such debts exclusive and even
unique. The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1)
confers an overriding effect on the provisions of the RDDB
Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law for the time being in force.
Sub-section (2), however, makes the RDDB Act additional
to and not in derogation or annulment of the five Acts
mentioned therein i.e. Industrial Finance Corporation Act,
1948; the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951; the Unit
Trust of India Act, 1963; the Industrial Reconstruction
Bank of India Act, 1984 and the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985.
37. Sub-section (2) was added to SICA w.e.f.
17.01.2000 by Act No. 1 of 2000. There is no doubt that
when an Act provides, as here, that its provisions shall be
in addition to and not in derogation of another law or laws,
it means that the Legislature intends that such an
enactment shall co-exist along with the other Acts. It is
clearly not the intention of the Legislature, in such a case,
to annul or detract from the provisions of other laws. The
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term “in derogation of” means “in abrogation or repeal of.”
The Black’s Law Dictionary sets forth the following
meaning for “derogation”:
“The partial repeal or abrogation of a law by a
later act that limits its scope or impairs its
utility and force.”
It is clear that sub-section (1) contains a non-obstante
clause, which gives the overriding effect to the RDDB Act.
Sub-section (2) acts in the nature of an exception to such
an overriding effect. It states that this overriding effect is
in relation to certain laws and that the RDDB Act shall be
in addition to and not in abrogation of, such laws. The
SICA is undoubtedly one such law.
38. The effect of sub-section (2) must necessarily be to
preserve the powers of the authorities under the SICA and
save the proceedings from being overridden by the later
Act i.e. the RDDB Act.
39. We, thus, find a harmonious scheme in relation to
the proceedings for reconstruction of the company under
the SICA, which includes the reconstruction of debts and
even the sale or lease of the sick company’s properties for
the purpose, which may or may not be a part of the
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security executed by the sick company in favour of a bank
or a financial institution on the one hand, and the
provisions of the RDDB Act, which deal with recovery of
debts due to banks or financial institutions, if necessary by
enforcing the security charged with the bank or financial
institution, on the other.
40. There is no doubt that both are special laws. SICA is
a special law, which deals with the reconstruction of sick
companies and matters incidental thereto, though it is
general as regards other matters such as recovery of
debts. The RDDB Act is also a special law, which deals
with the recovery of money due to banks or financial
institutions, through a special procedure, though it may be
general as regards other matters such as the
reconstruction of sick companies which it does not even
specifically deal with. Thus the purpose of the two laws is
different.
41. Parliament must be deemed to have had knowledge
of the earlier law i.e. SICA, enacted in 1985, while
enacting the RDDB Act, 1993. It is with a view to prevent
a clash of procedure, and the possibility of contradictory
orders in regard to the same entity and its properties, and
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in particular, to preserve the steps already taken for
reconstruction of a sick company in relation to the
properties of such sick company, which may be charged as
security with the banks or financial institutions, that
Parliament has specifically enacted sub-section (2). The
SICA had been enacted in respect of specified and limited
companies i.e. those which owned industrial undertakings
specified in the schedule to the IDR Act, as mentioned
earlier, whereas the RDDB Act deals with all persons, who
may have taken a loan from a bank or a financial
institution in cash or otherwise, whether secured or
unsecured etc.
42. Indeed, the question as to which Act shall prevail
must be considered with respect to the purpose of the two
enactments; which of the two Acts is the general or
special; which is later. It must also be considered whether
they can be harmoniously construed.
43. The conflict that is said to arise is between Section
22 of the SICA which purports to make untenable
“proceedings” for recovery of the debt against the sick
company and “suits” for recovery on the one hand and on
the other hand Section 34 of the RDDB Act contains an
28
Page 29
overriding effect to its own provision, obviously including
those for recovery of debts. Some of the decisions of this
Court dealing with this aspect may be noticed in Ram
Narain Vs. Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd.2. Two
statutes, both containing non-obstante clauses providing
that the particular provisions of the Act shall have effect
(notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained therein in
any other law for the time being in force) fell for
consideration. The two Acts were the Banking Company
Act 1949 and the Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment)
Act, 1951. This Court gave primacy to the Banking
Companies Act. While doing so, this Court observed:-
“7. ….. It is therefore, desirable to determine
the overriding effect of one or the other of the
relevant provisions in these two Acts, in a
given case, on much broader considerations of
the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts
and the clear intendment conveyed by the
language of the relevant provisions therein.”
44. In a subsequent case, this Court held that the right
to possession enacted by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
2
AIR 1956 SC 614 : 1956 SCR 603
29
Page 30
was not controlled by the Slum Clearance Act and the right
could be enforced in the manner provided in Section 25-B
without obtaining prior permission of the competent
authority under the Slum Clearance Act. The conflict arose
since the Slum Clearance Act contained a non-obstante
clause, to the effect that proceedings for eviction of
tenants could not be taken without prior permission of the
competent authority. The Delhi Rent Control Act conferred
a right under Section 14-A to recover immediate
possession in case the landlord had to vacate residential
premises allotted to him by the Central Government. This
right was conferred with a non-obstante clause. This Court
held that for resolving such conflicts, one test which may
be adopted is that the later enactment must prevail over
the earlier one. Having observed that the relevant
provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act had been enacted
from 01.12.1975 alongwith a non-obstante clause with the
knowledge that the overriding provision of the Slum
Clearance Act was already in existence, the later
enactment must prevail over the former.
30
Page 31
45. In LIC Vs. D.J. Bahadur3 this Court considered the
question as to which of the two laws i.e. the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (the ID Act) and the Life Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956 (the LIC Act), was a special law.
Having regard to the doctrine of generalia specialibus non
derogant (general provisions will not abrogate special
provisions), it was submitted that an employee of the LIC
cannot invoke the provisions of the ID Act in his complaint,
and the matter would have to be decided in accordance
with the LIC Act. The Court observed that the LIC Act was
“special” as regards nationalization of the life insurance
business. But however, the disputes between employer
and employee had to be dealt with under the ID Act which
was a special law for resolving such disputes and if a
dispute arose between employer and employee in the Life
Insurance Corporation, the LIC Act must be treated as
“general law” and the ID Act should be treated as “special
law.” The Court thus observed:-
“52. In determining whether a statute is a
special or a general one, the focus must be on
the principal subject-matter plus the particular
3
(1981) 1 SCC 315
31
Page 32
perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may
be general and for certain other purposes it
may be special and we cannot blur distinctions
when dealing with finer points of law. In law,
we have a cosmos of relatively no absolutes -
so too in life.”
46. In Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. Vs. State Industrial &
Investment Corpn. Of Maharashtra Ltd. 4, the conflict arose
between two special statues i.e. the State Financial
Corporations Act, 1951 and the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA). This Court came to
the conclusion that the 1951 Act deals with the presickness
situation, whereas the 1985 Act deals with the
post-sickness situation, and therefore, it was not possible
to agree that the 1951 Act is a special statute vis-à-vis the
1985 Act which is a general statute. The Court observed:-
“Both are special statues dealing with different
situations notwithstanding a slight overlap
here and there, for example, both of them
provide for grant of financial assistance though
in different situations. We must, therefore,
hold that in cases of sick industrial
4
(1993) 2 SCC 144
32
Page 33
undertakings the provisions contained in the
1985 Act would ordinarily prevail and govern.”
47. In a subsequent decision in Allahabad Bank Vs.
Canara Bank5, this Court held that with reference to the
Companies Act, the RDDB Act should be considered as a
“special law” though both laws could be treated as “special
laws” in respect of recovery of dues by banks and financial
institutions. In a later case the question arose in the
context of Special Court (Trial of offences Relating to
Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 and SICA. It was
contended that in view of the special provisions contained
in SICA no proceedings could have been initiated under the
Special Court Act. The Court observed that though Section
32 of the SICA contained a non-obstante clause, there was
a similar non-obstante clause in Section 13 of the Special
Court Act. The Court observed:-
“9… This Court has laid down in no uncertain
terms that in such an event it is the later Act
which must prevail.”
5
(2000) 4 SCC 406
33
Page 34
48. This Court approved the observations of the Special
Court to the effect that if the legislature confers a nonobstante
clause on a later enactment, it means that the
legislature intends that the later enactment should prevail.
Further, it is a settled rule of interpretation that if one
construction leads to a conflict, whereas on another
construction two Acts can be harmoniously construed, then
the latter must be adopted.
49. In view of the observations of this Court in the
decisions referred to and relied on by the learned counsel
for the parties we find that, the purpose of the two
enactments is entirely different. As observed earlier, the
purpose of one is to provide ameliorative measures for
reconstruction of sick companies, and the purpose of the
other is to provide for speedy recovery of debts of banks
and financial institutions. Both the Acts are “special” in
this sense. However, with reference to the specific
purpose of reconstruction of sick companies, the SICA
must be held to be a special law, though it may be
considered to be a general law in relation to the recovery
of debts. Whereas, the RDDB Act may be considered to be
a special law in relation to the recovery of debts and the
34
Page 35
SICA may be considered to be a general law in this regard.
For this purpose we rely on the decision in LIC Vs. Vijay
Bahadur (supra). Normally the latter of the two would
prevail on the principle that the Legislature was aware that
it had enacted the earlier Act and yet chose to enact the
subsequent Act with a non-obstante clause. In this case,
however, the express intendment of Parliament in the nonobstante
clause of the RDDB Act does not permit us to
take that view. Though the RDDB Act is the later
enactment, sub-section (2) of Section 34 specifically
provides that the provisions of the Act or the rules
thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of,
the other laws mentioned therein including SICA.
50. The term “not in derogation” clearly expresses the
intention of Parliament not to detract from or abrogate the
provisions of SICA in any way. This, in effect must mean
that Parliament intended the proceedings under SICA for
reconstruction of a sick company to go on and for that
purpose further intended that all other proceedings against
the company and its properties should be stayed pending
the process of reconstruction. While the term
“proceedings” under Section 22 did not originally include
35
Page 36
the RDDB Act, which was not there in existence. Section
22 covers proceedings under the RDDB Act.
51. The purpose of the two Acts is entirely different and
where actions under the two laws may seem to be in
conflict, Parliament has wisely preserved the proceedings
under the SICA, by specifically providing for sub-section
(2), which lays down that the later Act RDDB shall be in
addition to and not in derogation of the SICA.
52. We might add that this conclusion has been guided
by what is considered to be one of the most crucial
principles of interpretation viz. giving effect to the
intention of the Legislature. The difficulty arose in this
case mainly due to the absence of specific words denoting
the intention of Parliament to cover applications for
recovery of debts under the RDDB Act while enacting
Section 22 of the SICA. As observed earlier, the obvious
reason for this absence is the fact that the SICA was
enacted earlier. It is the duty of this Court to consider
SICA, after the enactment of the RDDB Act to ascertain the
true intent and purpose of providing that no proceedings
for execution or distraints or suits shall lie or be proceeded
with. Undoubtedly, in the narrower sense an application
36
Page 37
for recovery of debt can be giving a restricted meaning i.e.
a proceeding which commences on filing and terminates at
the judgment. However, there is no need to give such a
restricted meaning, since the true purpose of an
application for recovery is to proceed to the logical end of
execution and recovery itself, that is by way of execution
and distraint. We thus have no hesitation in coming to the
conclusion that Section 22 clearly covers and interdicts
such an application for recovery made under the provisions
of the RDB Act. We might remind ourselves of the oftquoted
statement of the principles of contextual
construction laid down by this Court in Reserve Bank of
India Versus Peerless General Finance and Investment Co.
Ltd. & Ors.6, where this Court has observed:-
“33. Interpretation must depend on the
text and the context. They are the bases of
interpretation. One may well say if the text is the
texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither
can be ignored. Both are important. That
interpretation is best which makes the textual
interpretation match the contextual. A statute is
best interpreted when we know why it was
6
(1987)1 SCC 424
37
Page 38
enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must
be read, first as a whole and then section by
section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and
word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the
context of its enactment, with the glasses of the
statute-maker, provided by such context, its
scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and
words may take colour and appear different than
when the statute is looked at without the glasses
provided by the context. With these glasses we
must look at the Act as a whole and discover
what each section, each clause, each phrase and
each word is meant and designed to say as to fit
into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a
statute and no word of a statute can be
construed in isolation. Statutes have to be
construed so that every word has a place and
everything is in its place.”
53. Moreover, we have found nothing contrary in the
intention of the SICA to exclude a recovery application from
the purview of Section 22, indeed there could be no reason
for such exclusion since the purpose of the provision is to
protect the properties of a sick company, so that they may
be dealt with in the best possible way for the purpose of its
revival by the BIFR. In State of Punjab Vs. The Okara
38
Page 39
Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd.7, the Court articulated the
importance of preserving the beneficent purpose of the
statute and observed:-
“14. …….. We shall therefore proceed to
examine the provisions of the Act on the footing
that the test for determining whether the
Government is bound by a statute is whether it is
expressly named in the provision which it is
contended binds it, or whether it “is manifest that
from the terms of the statute, that it was the
intention of the legislature that it shall be bound”,
and that the intention to bind would be clearly made
out if the beneficent purpose of the statute would
be wholly frustrated unless the Government were
bound.”
54. Having answered the reference, we hold that the
provisions of SICA, in particular Section 22, shall prevail
over the provision for the recovery of debts in the RDDB
Act. In these circumstances, as already directed by the
two-Judge Bench of this Court, the Judgment and Order
dated 23.02.06 of the High Court of Delhi is set aside. As
far as the writ petitions are concerned, whether on the
ground that Section 22 of the SICA acts as a bar to the
7
AIR 1964 SC 669
39
Page 40
recovery proceedings under the RDDB Act or whether the
protection of SICA is not available to the appellant
company since the recovery proceedings under the RDDB
Act had been concluded, the writ petitions would have to
be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. The present
appeal is allowed.
……………………….…..........…..CJI.
[H.L.DATTU]
................................………J.
[S.A. BOBDE]
...............................………J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
NEW DELHI,
OCTOBER 27, 2014
40
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 5225 OF 2008
KSL & INDUSTRIES LTD. …. APPELLANT
VERSUS
M/S ARIHANT THREADS LTD. & ORS. …. RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
S. A. BOBDE, J.
1. This appeal is placed before us by way of a
reference, made by a two-Judge Bench of this Court, C.K.
Thakker and Altamas Kabir, JJ. which heard the matter on
an earlier occasion and held that the appeal deserves to be
allowed and that the Judgment and Order passed by the
High Court is liable to be set aside. In view of a difference
of opinion having arisen on the interpretation of Section 34
of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the
1
Page 2
`RDDB' Act) the matter has been referred for decision to
this Bench by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India.
2. The present appeal is preferred by KSL & Industries
Ltd. (`appellant' for short) against the final Judgment and
Order dated 23.02.06 passed by the Delhi High Court in
Writ Petition Nos. 2041-2042 OF 2006. The High Court set
aside the Order passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate
Tribunal, Delhi (`DRAT' for short) and held that in view of
the bar contained in Section 22 of the Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereafter
referred to as `SICA') no recovery proceedings could be
effected against Respondent No. 1 (M/s. Arihant Threads
Ltd.) (‘Company' for short).
3. The Company set up an export oriented spinning unit
for manufacturing cotton yarn in Amritsar District, in the
State of Punjab. The Company took on lease, Plot No. 454
in 1992 for a period of 99 years from Goindwal Sahib
Industrial & Investment Corporation, on a condition that it
would not transfer the interest in the property for the first
fifteen years without prior permission of the lessor. The
Company had a right to mortgage lease-hold rights to a
Bank, the Punjab Financial Corporation or the Life
2
Page 3
Insurance Corporation of India as security for a loan. It
got its project financed by the Industrial Development
Bank of India (`IDBI' for short) by way of foreign currency
loan and a working capital of Rs. 93.1 million.
4. Since the Company failed to repay loan installments,
IDBI filed Original Application No. 1368 of 2001 on
December 20.12.01 in Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh
(`DRT' for short) for recovery of Rs. 25,26,60,836/- under
the RDDB Act. In the proceedings before the DRT the
Company remained absent, although, duly served. On
15.07.03, an ex-parte final order in favour of IDBI for
recovery of above mentioned sum i.e. Rs. 25,26,60,836/-
along with interest @ 7.8% p.a. was passed by DRT. DRT
expressly directed that in the event of failure on the part of
the Company to pay the decretal amount, IDBI will be
entitled to sell the mortgaged property of the company and
recover the amount. If the amount remained unrecovered
even then, it shall be recovered from the sale of personal
properties of the defendants therein.
5. On 09.09.03, the Recovery Officer issued a
composite demand notice under Rule 2 of Second Schedule
of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the Company
3
Page 4
demanding payment of Rs. 28,60,87,384/-. He directed
the Company to appear for settling terms and conditions of
the proclamation of sale and for disclosure of its movable
and immovable assets.
6. On 16.09.04, the Recovery Officer fixed the reserve
price of the movable and immovable properties at
Rs. 12.50 crores. On 18.10.04, the Company filed an
appeal under Section 30 of the RDDB Act against the order
dated 16.09.04 fixing reserve price of the movable and
immovable properties at Rs. 12.50 crores. On 30.10.04,
the appellant was declared the highest bidder at Rs. 12.52
crores and was thus successful. On 15.12.04, the Company
moved an application for setting aside the ex-parte final
order, passed on 15.07.03 by DRT Chandigarh in favour of
IDBI, directing recovery of Rs. 25,26,60,836/- along with
interest @ 7.8% p.a. The appellant, who had become the
auction-purchaser of the company’s properties objected to
the prayer of the Company for setting aside the ex-parte
order and applied for impleadment. Meanwhile, the
Company got its property valued by Himachal Consultancy
Organisation Ltd. The realizable value of the company’s
property had been valued at Rs. 20.22 crores.
4
Page 5
7. On 26.07.05, DRT-I, Delhi allowed the Company’s
appeal filed under Section 30 of the RDDB Act against
fixation of reserve price at Rs. 12.50 crores. DRT-I, Delhi,
set aside the auction sale subject to payment of a certain
amount, interest, expenses, etc.
8. Objecting to these conditions, the Company filed an
appeal to the DRAT, Delhi. The appellant also filed an
appeal being aggrieved by the setting aside of the sale in
its favour. The DRAT stayed the order dated 26.07.05 by
which the ex-parte order against the Company was set
aside and directed refund of sale amount to the appellant.
9. On 21.12.05, the Company invoked the provisions of
SICA. It filed a Reference before the Board of Industrial
Finance & Reconstruction (`BIFR' for short). On 10.02.06,
the DRAT dismissed the appeal filed by the Company and
allowed the appeal of the appellant. The DRAT confirmed
auction-sale in favour of the appellant on depositing the
sale price. The DRAT directed that steps to handover
possession of the property to the auction-purchaser
(appellant) be taken by the Recovery Officer and the
appellant shall deposit the entire amount.
5
Page 6
10. Before the formalities directed by the DRAT could be
completed, the Company filed two Writ Petitions before the
Delhi High Court against the order of the DRAT, Delhi. The
Delhi High Court allowed the Writ Petitions vide impugned
order dated 23.02.06 and set aside the order passed by
the DRAT, Delhi on the ground that in view of the bar of
Section 22 of the SICA, the recovery proceedings could not
be pursued against the Company and no order ought to
have been passed by the DRAT, Delhi.
11. Subsequent to the order of the High Court, the BIFR
rejected the Reference of the Company and the Company
preferred an appeal, which is pending before the Appellate
Authority for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR).
The second Reference has also been filed by the Company
which has been registered as BIFR Case No. 18 of 2006, in
which the Company has been declared as a `sick
Company' and respondent No. 5 [Stressed Assets
Stablization Fund, Mumbai] has been appointed as
Operating Agency to prepare Rehabilitation Scheme.
12. As stated earlier, the matter was earlier heard by a
two Judge Bench of this Court. One of the learned Judges,
Thakker, J. held that the provisions of RDDB Act should be
6
Page 7
given priority and primacy over SICA by virtue of Section
34 of the RDDB Act as it is a subsequent enactment.
Therefore it may be presumed even in the absence of any
specific provision, that Parliament was aware of all the
statutes enacted prior thereto; that the non-obstante
clause had been inserted to ensure expeditious
adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and
financial institutions. Thakker, J. also held that in view of
sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the RDDB Act, which
provides that the provisions of the Act are “in addition to
and not in derogation of” inter alia SICA, which is an
additional factor why the RDDB Act shall prevail. Kabir, J.
as His Lordship then was, held that the non-obstante
clause in Section 34(1) contains an exception, to be found
in sub-section (2). Sub-section (2) provides that the Act
shall be in addition to and not in derogation of inter alia
the SICA. Further, that the overriding effect of RDDB Act
would have an overriding effect over other enactments but
supplemental to the provisions of SICA, and therefore, the
provisions of SICA would prevail over the provisions of the
RDDB Act.
7
Page 8
13. Kabir, J. further held that since the proceedings for
recovery had long been over, before the Company invoked
provisions of the SICA Act, the Company would therefore
not be entitled to any relief before the High Court.
14. Kabir, J. referred to the following facts for drawing
this conclusion. It was only on 21.12.05, that the Company
filed a Reference before the BIFR which was dismissed on
10.02.06. Before this, the Recovery Officer had issued a
demand notice under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule to the
Income Tax Act, 1961 demanding payment of
Rs. 28,60,87,384/-, as directed by the DRT, Chandigarh in
the final order. Thereafter, several events had taken place,
such as, on 27.10.2004, DRT allowed the auction sale
proceedings but directed it should not be confirmed; on
30.10.04, the appellant was declared to be the highest
bidder and had deposited the entire sale price on
11.11.04; in the appeal under Section 30 of the RDDB Act,
the Company moved an application for setting aside the
ex-parte order against fixation of reserve price and this
appeal was allowed on 26.07.2005 subject to fulfillment of
certain terms and conditions. It was observed that the
appeal filed by the Company was only against fixation of
8
Page 9
the reserve price and not against the final order. The
Company had not even availed of an appeal under Section
20 of the RDDB Act or for setting aside the sale under Rule
60 of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961
but only chose the path for having the auction-sale set
aside on the ground that the reserve price of the
Company’s assets had not been correctly fixed. In effect,
proceedings had been concluded in favour of the IDBI
under Section 19 of the RDDB Act long before the BIFR
came into the scene. That auction sale of the properties
under the RDDB Act was confirmed by the DRAT before the
writ petitions were allowed by the High Court.
15. The Company's first Reference was rejected by the
BIFR and only the second reference made on 15.09.06,
had been allowed i.e. after the High Court’s order dated
23.02.06. Since the recovery proceedings have been
concluded in favour of the appellant and the appellant had
also deposited the sale price, the respondent was not
entitled to any relief by virtue of Section 22 of the SICA
before the High Court.
16. In the circumstances, both the learned Judges held,
for different reasons, that the appeal deserves to be
9
Page 10
allowed and the Judgment and Order of the High Court is
liable to be set aside. Since, there was a difference of
opinion on the question of law, a reference was made to a
larger Bench.
SCHEME AND PURPOSE OF THE SICK INDUSTRIAL
COMPANIES (SPECIAL PROVISIONS) ACT, 1985
[SICA]
17. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, sets
out the following:
While interpreting which of the two Acts i.e. The Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 [SICA]
or the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 [RDDB Act] should prevail, in view of
the non obstante clause contained in both, one of the
important tests is the purpose of the two enactments. It is
important to recognize and ensure that the purpose of
both enactments is as far as possible, fulfilled.
18. The SICA was enacted to provide for timely
determination of a body of experts for providing
preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures
10
Page 11
that would need to be adopted to sick companies. The illeffects
of sickness in industrial companies such as loss of
production, loss of employment, loss of revenue to the
Central and State Governments and locking up of
investible funds of banks and financial institutions were of
serious concern to the Government and the society at
large. In order to fully utilize the productive industrial
assets, afford maximum protection of employment and
optimize the use of funds of the banks and financial
institutions, it was found imperative to revive and
rehabilitate the potentially liable sick industrial companies.
19. Multiplicity of laws and agencies made the adoption
of a coordinated approach for dealing with sick industrial
companies difficult. The Sick Industrial Companies Bill was
introduced in the Parliament to enact legislation for timely
determination of a body of experts for providing
preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures.
20. As would appear significant in the scheme of things
relevant to this matter, an important reference is made to
the “multiplicity of laws and agencies” making the adoption
of a coordinated approach for dealing with sick industrial
companies difficult.
11
Page 12
21. The term “sick industrial company” has been defined
to mean an industrial company (being a company
registered for not less than five years) which has at the
end of any financial year accumulated losses equal to or
exceeding its entire net worth, vide Section 3(o).
“Industrial Company” means a company which owns one
or more industrial undertakings, vide Section 3(e).
“Industrial Undertaking” has been defined to mean an
undertaking pertaining to a scheduled industry carried on
in one or more factories by any company, vide Section
3(f).
22. In effect a “sick industrial company” is a company
owning one or more industrial undertakings pertaining to a
scheduled industry as contemplated by the Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (IDRA).
23. The Act thus aims to revive and rehabilitate, not all
sick companies but those in the schedule to the IDRA,
presumably vital to the economy of the nation.
24. The Act provides for an Inquiry into whether a
company is a sick industrial company, an assessment
whether it can be made viable and the preparation and
12
Page 13
sanction of a scheme for inter alia the financial
reconstruction of the sick industrial company. It provides
for the proper management of the sick industrial company,
amalgamation, sale or lease of a part or whole of an
industrial undertaking of the sick company etc., vide
Sections 16, 17 and 18 of the SICA Act.
25. The Act confers wide powers on the Board to provide
in the scheme - amalgamation of the sick industrial
company with a transferee company, the alteration of the
memorandum or articles of association, reduction of the
interest or rights of the shareholders and for continuation
of legal proceedings, the sale or lease of the industrial
undertaking etc.
26. It is in this background that Section 22, which
provides for suspension of legal proceedings, is enacted.
To the extent it is relevant here, the Section reads as
under:
“ 22. SUSPENSION OF LEGAL
PROCEEDINGS, CONTRACTS, ETC.
(1) Where in respect of an industrial company,
an inquiry under Section 16 is pending, or any
scheme referred to under Section 17 is under
13
Page 14
preparation or consideration or a sanctioned
scheme is under implementation or where an
appeal under Section 25 relating to an
industrial company is pending, then,
notwithstanding anything contained in the
Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any other
law or the memorandum and articles of
association of the industrial company or any
other instrument having effect under the said
Act or other law, no proceedings for the
winding-up of the industrial company or for
execution, distress or the like against any of
the properties of the industrial company or for
the appointment of a receiver in respect
thereof and no suit for the recovery of money
or for the enforcement of any security against
the industrial company or of any guarantee in
respect of any loans, or advance granted to
the industrial company shall lie or be
proceeded with further, except with the
consent of the Board or, as the case may be,
the Appellate Authority.”
27. The Section is enacted against the backdrop of the
existing multitude of remedies which creditors may avail of
against an indebted company and its properties bringing
them to attachments, auction sale etc., making it difficult
for the authorities entrusted with its reconstruction under
14
Page 15
the SICA to evolve a scheme for reconstruction. The
Section is also given primacy by way of a non-obstante
clause vide Section 32 of SICA which reads as follows:-
“32. Effect of the Act on other laws
(1) The provisions of this Act and of any rules
or schemes made there under shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law except
the provisions of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973) and the
Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
(33 of 1976) for the time being in force or in
the Memorandum or Articles of Association of
an industrial company or in any other
instrument having effect by virtue of any law
other than this Act.
(2) Where there has been under any scheme
under this Act an amalgamation of a sick
industrial company with another company, the
provisions of Section 72A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) shall, subject to the
modifications that the power of the Central
Government under that section may be
exercised by the Board without any
recommendation by the specified authority
referred to in that section, apply in relation to
such amalgamation as they apply in relation to
15
Page 16
the amalgamation of a company owning an
industrial undertaking with another company.”
28. It may also be noted that the Section, along with the
SICA was enacted in 1985. At that time the remedies
which were later on provided by the RDDB Act 1993, for
recovery by a creditor through an application to the Debt
Recovery Tribunal were not in existence nor contemplated.
There is naturally no reference to such a mode of recovery
in the SICA and neither is a stay contemplated of such a
proceedings in express terms. We say this in view of the
submission advanced before us that Section 22 only
contemplates a stay of proceedings for the distress or
execution of the properties of the sick company and suits
for recovery and that therefore an application for recovery
under the RDDB Act cannot be stayed, and must proceed.
We might also observe that the consequence of accepting
the submission that Section 22 cannot affect or render
untenable an application for recovery under the RDDB Act,
would result in an anomaly. The submission is that Section
22 lays down that only proceeding for winding up or
execution, distress or the like shall not lie or be proceeded
with where an enquiry is pending or a scheme is under
16
Page 17
preparation or consideration or a sanction scheme is under
implementation etc.; whereas a proceeding for recovery of
a debt may proceed. To put it another way, that a
proceeding for recovery shall lie against a sick company
but an order made in it could not be executed against any
of the properties of the industrial company, the effect
being that the proceedings may continue without any
consequence. Thus there cannot be any execution or
distraint against the properties of the company but
creditors may continue to apply for recovery before the
DRT. We do not think that such an anomalous purpose can
be attributed to Parliament in the present legislative
scheme. Though there is no doubt that Parliament may
expressly bring about such a situation if it considers it
desirable. Even otherwise, it appears that the legislative
purpose for reconstruction of companies could be thwarted
if creditors are allowed to encumber the properties of the
company with decrees of the DRT while the BIFR is
engaged in reviving the company, if necessary, by leasing
or selling the properties of the company for which there is
an express power.
17
Page 18
29. Plainly, the purpose of laying down that no
proceedings for execution and distraint or the like or a suit
for recovery shall not lie, is to protect the properties of the
sick industrial company and the company itself from being
proceeded against by its creditors who may wish to seek
the winding up of the company or levy execution or
distress against its properties. It protects the company
from all such proceedings. It also protects the company
from suits for recovery of money or for the enforcement of
any security or of any guarantee in respect of any loans, or
advances granted to the industrial company. But as is
apparent, the immunity is not absolute. Such proceeding
which a creditor may wish to institute, may be instituted or
continued with the consent of the Board or the Appellate
Authority. In the Section as originally enacted, the words
“and no suit for the recovery of money or for
the enforcement of any security ……………” were not there.
These words appear to have been inserted to expressly
provide, rather clarify that no suits for the recovery of
money etc. would lie or be proceeded with against such a
company.
18
Page 19
30. At this juncture, it would apposite to notice the
judgment of this Court in Kailash Nath Agarwal and Ors.
Vs. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P.
Ltd. & Anr.1, where this Court considered whether Section
22 afforded protection to guarantors of the sick company
or only to the sick company. It was contended that
Section 22 prohibits the filing of a suit for recovery of
money or for enforcement of any guarantee in respect of a
loan or advance granted to an industrial company. It was
claimed that if proceedings for recovery through a court of
law were prohibited under Section 22(1), there was no
reason that protection should be refused when action was
sought to be taken without recourse to Court. The Court
held that the words “proceedings” and “suit” had to be
construed differently as carrying different meanings,
since, they had been used to denote different things. The
Court concluded that Section 22(1) only prohibits recovery
against the industrial company and there is no protection
offered to guarantors against the recovery proceedings.
1
(2003) 4 SCC 305
19
Page 20
31. On the strength of this decision in Kailash Nath
Agarwal (supra) it was contended that the application for
recovery against the Company filed under the RDDB Act in
the execution of which the appellant had purchased the
property of the Company was neither a “proceeding” nor a
“suit” within the meaning of Section 22. Therefore, the
proceedings in the application for recovery remained
ineffective by Section 22. We find, however, that the
judgment in Kailash Nath Agarwal does not come to the
aid of the appellant. That judgment did not consider the
question that has arisen in this case. It dealt with the
question regarding the scope of protection afforded to
guarantors under Section 22(1) of the SICA, and held that
there was no protection afforded to guarantors as distinct
from the sick company under Section 22(1), since the
expression “suit” was used only in relation to sick industrial
companies and not to guarantors. Similarly, the
expression “proceeding” in relation to distress and
execution, was used to denote something other than a
“suit”. No such question arises in this case.
32. As observed earlier, sub-section (1) of Section 22
may be divided into two parts. In one part, it provides
20
Page 21
that “no proceedings” be instituted for the winding up of
the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like
against any of the properties of such industrial company,
and in the second part it provides that “no suit” for the
recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security
against the industrial company or of any guarantee in
respect of any loans or advances granted to the industrial
company, “shall lie or be proceeded with further, except
with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the
Appellate Authority.”
33. Undoubtedly, the present proceedings viz.
“application for recovery” cannot specifically be described
as proceedings for execution, distress or the like against
any of the properties, but it is certainly a proceeding which
results in and in fact had resulted in the execution and
distress against the property of the Company and is
therefore liable to be construed as a proceeding for the
execution, distress or the like against any of the properties
of the industrial company. We are of the view that such a
construction would be within the intendment of Parliament
wherever the proceedings for recovery of a debt which has
been secured by a mortgage or pledge of the property of
21
Page 22
the borrower are instituted. Surely, there is no purpose in
construing that Parliament intended that such an
application for recovery by summary procedure should lie
or be proceeded with, but only its execution be interdicted
or inhibited especially. In this context, it may be
remembered that the proceedings by way of an application
for recovery according to a summary procedure as
provided under the RDDB Act are not referred to in Section
22 simply because the RDDB Act had not then been
enacted.
SCHEME AND PURPOSE OF THE RECOVERY OF DEBTS
DUE TO BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT,
1993 (RDDB ACT)
34. In 1993, Parliament passed the Recovery of Debts
due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, i.e. the
RDDB Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons recited
that more than fifteen lakhs of cases filed by the public
sector banks and about 304 cases filed by the financial
institutions involving recovery of debts of more than
Rs. 5622 crores in dues of Public Sector Banks and about
Rs. 391 crores of dues of the financial institutions were
pending. The locking of such huge amounts of public
22
Page 23
money prevented proper utilisation and recycling of the
funds for the development of the country. The RDDB Act
was thus enacted to prevent such stagnation of huge
amounts of public money due to the existing procedure for
recovery of debts. The urgent need to work out a suitable
mechanism through which the debts of the banks and
financial institutions could be realised without delay was in
the form of Special Tribunals, which would follow summary
procedure. These Tribunals eventually came to be known
as Debt Recovery Tribunals.
35. The ‘debt’ contemplated by the RDDB Act refers to
the liability claimed as due, by a bank or a financial
institution from any person, whether secured or unsecured
or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil
court or any arbitration award or under a mortgage and
legally recoverable, vide Section 2 (g). Applications for
recovery were required to be made to a Tribunal
established under Section 3. Appeals were to lie before the
Appellate Tribunal under Section 20. Upon the adjudication
of the application/appeal by the Tribunal, the certificate of
recovery is made executable by Chapter V under
Section 25. The Recovery Officer on receipt of the copy of
23
Page 24
certificate is required to proceed to recover the amount of
debt specified in the certificate by attachment and sale of
the movable or immovable property of the defendant etc.,
vide Section 25. Section 18 bars the jurisdiction of any
court or any authority except the Supreme Court and a
High Court, in relation to an application for recovery of
debts due to banks and financial institutions. Section 34,
with which we are concerned, confers an overriding effect
on the RDDB Act in the following terms:
“34. Act to have overriding effect.--(1)
Save as provided under Sub-section (2), the
provisions of this Act shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law for the
time being in force or in any instrument having
effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.
(2) The provisions of this Act or the rules
made thereunder shall be in addition to, and
not in derogation of, the Industrial Finance
Corporation Act, 1948, the State Financial
Corporations Act, 1951, the Unit Trust of India
Act, 1963, the Industrial Reconstruction Bank
of India Act, 1984 and the Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and
the Small Industries Bank of India Act, 1989.”
24
Page 25
36. This special law, which deals with the recovery of
debts due to banks and financial institutions, makes the
procedure for recovery of such debts exclusive and even
unique. The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1)
confers an overriding effect on the provisions of the RDDB
Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law for the time being in force.
Sub-section (2), however, makes the RDDB Act additional
to and not in derogation or annulment of the five Acts
mentioned therein i.e. Industrial Finance Corporation Act,
1948; the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951; the Unit
Trust of India Act, 1963; the Industrial Reconstruction
Bank of India Act, 1984 and the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985.
37. Sub-section (2) was added to SICA w.e.f.
17.01.2000 by Act No. 1 of 2000. There is no doubt that
when an Act provides, as here, that its provisions shall be
in addition to and not in derogation of another law or laws,
it means that the Legislature intends that such an
enactment shall co-exist along with the other Acts. It is
clearly not the intention of the Legislature, in such a case,
to annul or detract from the provisions of other laws. The
25
Page 26
term “in derogation of” means “in abrogation or repeal of.”
The Black’s Law Dictionary sets forth the following
meaning for “derogation”:
“The partial repeal or abrogation of a law by a
later act that limits its scope or impairs its
utility and force.”
It is clear that sub-section (1) contains a non-obstante
clause, which gives the overriding effect to the RDDB Act.
Sub-section (2) acts in the nature of an exception to such
an overriding effect. It states that this overriding effect is
in relation to certain laws and that the RDDB Act shall be
in addition to and not in abrogation of, such laws. The
SICA is undoubtedly one such law.
38. The effect of sub-section (2) must necessarily be to
preserve the powers of the authorities under the SICA and
save the proceedings from being overridden by the later
Act i.e. the RDDB Act.
39. We, thus, find a harmonious scheme in relation to
the proceedings for reconstruction of the company under
the SICA, which includes the reconstruction of debts and
even the sale or lease of the sick company’s properties for
the purpose, which may or may not be a part of the
26
Page 27
security executed by the sick company in favour of a bank
or a financial institution on the one hand, and the
provisions of the RDDB Act, which deal with recovery of
debts due to banks or financial institutions, if necessary by
enforcing the security charged with the bank or financial
institution, on the other.
40. There is no doubt that both are special laws. SICA is
a special law, which deals with the reconstruction of sick
companies and matters incidental thereto, though it is
general as regards other matters such as recovery of
debts. The RDDB Act is also a special law, which deals
with the recovery of money due to banks or financial
institutions, through a special procedure, though it may be
general as regards other matters such as the
reconstruction of sick companies which it does not even
specifically deal with. Thus the purpose of the two laws is
different.
41. Parliament must be deemed to have had knowledge
of the earlier law i.e. SICA, enacted in 1985, while
enacting the RDDB Act, 1993. It is with a view to prevent
a clash of procedure, and the possibility of contradictory
orders in regard to the same entity and its properties, and
27
Page 28
in particular, to preserve the steps already taken for
reconstruction of a sick company in relation to the
properties of such sick company, which may be charged as
security with the banks or financial institutions, that
Parliament has specifically enacted sub-section (2). The
SICA had been enacted in respect of specified and limited
companies i.e. those which owned industrial undertakings
specified in the schedule to the IDR Act, as mentioned
earlier, whereas the RDDB Act deals with all persons, who
may have taken a loan from a bank or a financial
institution in cash or otherwise, whether secured or
unsecured etc.
42. Indeed, the question as to which Act shall prevail
must be considered with respect to the purpose of the two
enactments; which of the two Acts is the general or
special; which is later. It must also be considered whether
they can be harmoniously construed.
43. The conflict that is said to arise is between Section
22 of the SICA which purports to make untenable
“proceedings” for recovery of the debt against the sick
company and “suits” for recovery on the one hand and on
the other hand Section 34 of the RDDB Act contains an
28
Page 29
overriding effect to its own provision, obviously including
those for recovery of debts. Some of the decisions of this
Court dealing with this aspect may be noticed in Ram
Narain Vs. Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd.2. Two
statutes, both containing non-obstante clauses providing
that the particular provisions of the Act shall have effect
(notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained therein in
any other law for the time being in force) fell for
consideration. The two Acts were the Banking Company
Act 1949 and the Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment)
Act, 1951. This Court gave primacy to the Banking
Companies Act. While doing so, this Court observed:-
“7. ….. It is therefore, desirable to determine
the overriding effect of one or the other of the
relevant provisions in these two Acts, in a
given case, on much broader considerations of
the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts
and the clear intendment conveyed by the
language of the relevant provisions therein.”
44. In a subsequent case, this Court held that the right
to possession enacted by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
2
AIR 1956 SC 614 : 1956 SCR 603
29
Page 30
was not controlled by the Slum Clearance Act and the right
could be enforced in the manner provided in Section 25-B
without obtaining prior permission of the competent
authority under the Slum Clearance Act. The conflict arose
since the Slum Clearance Act contained a non-obstante
clause, to the effect that proceedings for eviction of
tenants could not be taken without prior permission of the
competent authority. The Delhi Rent Control Act conferred
a right under Section 14-A to recover immediate
possession in case the landlord had to vacate residential
premises allotted to him by the Central Government. This
right was conferred with a non-obstante clause. This Court
held that for resolving such conflicts, one test which may
be adopted is that the later enactment must prevail over
the earlier one. Having observed that the relevant
provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act had been enacted
from 01.12.1975 alongwith a non-obstante clause with the
knowledge that the overriding provision of the Slum
Clearance Act was already in existence, the later
enactment must prevail over the former.
30
Page 31
45. In LIC Vs. D.J. Bahadur3 this Court considered the
question as to which of the two laws i.e. the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (the ID Act) and the Life Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956 (the LIC Act), was a special law.
Having regard to the doctrine of generalia specialibus non
derogant (general provisions will not abrogate special
provisions), it was submitted that an employee of the LIC
cannot invoke the provisions of the ID Act in his complaint,
and the matter would have to be decided in accordance
with the LIC Act. The Court observed that the LIC Act was
“special” as regards nationalization of the life insurance
business. But however, the disputes between employer
and employee had to be dealt with under the ID Act which
was a special law for resolving such disputes and if a
dispute arose between employer and employee in the Life
Insurance Corporation, the LIC Act must be treated as
“general law” and the ID Act should be treated as “special
law.” The Court thus observed:-
“52. In determining whether a statute is a
special or a general one, the focus must be on
the principal subject-matter plus the particular
3
(1981) 1 SCC 315
31
Page 32
perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may
be general and for certain other purposes it
may be special and we cannot blur distinctions
when dealing with finer points of law. In law,
we have a cosmos of relatively no absolutes -
so too in life.”
46. In Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. Vs. State Industrial &
Investment Corpn. Of Maharashtra Ltd. 4, the conflict arose
between two special statues i.e. the State Financial
Corporations Act, 1951 and the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA). This Court came to
the conclusion that the 1951 Act deals with the presickness
situation, whereas the 1985 Act deals with the
post-sickness situation, and therefore, it was not possible
to agree that the 1951 Act is a special statute vis-à-vis the
1985 Act which is a general statute. The Court observed:-
“Both are special statues dealing with different
situations notwithstanding a slight overlap
here and there, for example, both of them
provide for grant of financial assistance though
in different situations. We must, therefore,
hold that in cases of sick industrial
4
(1993) 2 SCC 144
32
Page 33
undertakings the provisions contained in the
1985 Act would ordinarily prevail and govern.”
47. In a subsequent decision in Allahabad Bank Vs.
Canara Bank5, this Court held that with reference to the
Companies Act, the RDDB Act should be considered as a
“special law” though both laws could be treated as “special
laws” in respect of recovery of dues by banks and financial
institutions. In a later case the question arose in the
context of Special Court (Trial of offences Relating to
Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 and SICA. It was
contended that in view of the special provisions contained
in SICA no proceedings could have been initiated under the
Special Court Act. The Court observed that though Section
32 of the SICA contained a non-obstante clause, there was
a similar non-obstante clause in Section 13 of the Special
Court Act. The Court observed:-
“9… This Court has laid down in no uncertain
terms that in such an event it is the later Act
which must prevail.”
5
(2000) 4 SCC 406
33
Page 34
48. This Court approved the observations of the Special
Court to the effect that if the legislature confers a nonobstante
clause on a later enactment, it means that the
legislature intends that the later enactment should prevail.
Further, it is a settled rule of interpretation that if one
construction leads to a conflict, whereas on another
construction two Acts can be harmoniously construed, then
the latter must be adopted.
49. In view of the observations of this Court in the
decisions referred to and relied on by the learned counsel
for the parties we find that, the purpose of the two
enactments is entirely different. As observed earlier, the
purpose of one is to provide ameliorative measures for
reconstruction of sick companies, and the purpose of the
other is to provide for speedy recovery of debts of banks
and financial institutions. Both the Acts are “special” in
this sense. However, with reference to the specific
purpose of reconstruction of sick companies, the SICA
must be held to be a special law, though it may be
considered to be a general law in relation to the recovery
of debts. Whereas, the RDDB Act may be considered to be
a special law in relation to the recovery of debts and the
34
Page 35
SICA may be considered to be a general law in this regard.
For this purpose we rely on the decision in LIC Vs. Vijay
Bahadur (supra). Normally the latter of the two would
prevail on the principle that the Legislature was aware that
it had enacted the earlier Act and yet chose to enact the
subsequent Act with a non-obstante clause. In this case,
however, the express intendment of Parliament in the nonobstante
clause of the RDDB Act does not permit us to
take that view. Though the RDDB Act is the later
enactment, sub-section (2) of Section 34 specifically
provides that the provisions of the Act or the rules
thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of,
the other laws mentioned therein including SICA.
50. The term “not in derogation” clearly expresses the
intention of Parliament not to detract from or abrogate the
provisions of SICA in any way. This, in effect must mean
that Parliament intended the proceedings under SICA for
reconstruction of a sick company to go on and for that
purpose further intended that all other proceedings against
the company and its properties should be stayed pending
the process of reconstruction. While the term
“proceedings” under Section 22 did not originally include
35
Page 36
the RDDB Act, which was not there in existence. Section
22 covers proceedings under the RDDB Act.
51. The purpose of the two Acts is entirely different and
where actions under the two laws may seem to be in
conflict, Parliament has wisely preserved the proceedings
under the SICA, by specifically providing for sub-section
(2), which lays down that the later Act RDDB shall be in
addition to and not in derogation of the SICA.
52. We might add that this conclusion has been guided
by what is considered to be one of the most crucial
principles of interpretation viz. giving effect to the
intention of the Legislature. The difficulty arose in this
case mainly due to the absence of specific words denoting
the intention of Parliament to cover applications for
recovery of debts under the RDDB Act while enacting
Section 22 of the SICA. As observed earlier, the obvious
reason for this absence is the fact that the SICA was
enacted earlier. It is the duty of this Court to consider
SICA, after the enactment of the RDDB Act to ascertain the
true intent and purpose of providing that no proceedings
for execution or distraints or suits shall lie or be proceeded
with. Undoubtedly, in the narrower sense an application
36
Page 37
for recovery of debt can be giving a restricted meaning i.e.
a proceeding which commences on filing and terminates at
the judgment. However, there is no need to give such a
restricted meaning, since the true purpose of an
application for recovery is to proceed to the logical end of
execution and recovery itself, that is by way of execution
and distraint. We thus have no hesitation in coming to the
conclusion that Section 22 clearly covers and interdicts
such an application for recovery made under the provisions
of the RDB Act. We might remind ourselves of the oftquoted
statement of the principles of contextual
construction laid down by this Court in Reserve Bank of
India Versus Peerless General Finance and Investment Co.
Ltd. & Ors.6, where this Court has observed:-
“33. Interpretation must depend on the
text and the context. They are the bases of
interpretation. One may well say if the text is the
texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither
can be ignored. Both are important. That
interpretation is best which makes the textual
interpretation match the contextual. A statute is
best interpreted when we know why it was
6
(1987)1 SCC 424
37
Page 38
enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must
be read, first as a whole and then section by
section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and
word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the
context of its enactment, with the glasses of the
statute-maker, provided by such context, its
scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and
words may take colour and appear different than
when the statute is looked at without the glasses
provided by the context. With these glasses we
must look at the Act as a whole and discover
what each section, each clause, each phrase and
each word is meant and designed to say as to fit
into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a
statute and no word of a statute can be
construed in isolation. Statutes have to be
construed so that every word has a place and
everything is in its place.”
53. Moreover, we have found nothing contrary in the
intention of the SICA to exclude a recovery application from
the purview of Section 22, indeed there could be no reason
for such exclusion since the purpose of the provision is to
protect the properties of a sick company, so that they may
be dealt with in the best possible way for the purpose of its
revival by the BIFR. In State of Punjab Vs. The Okara
38
Page 39
Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd.7, the Court articulated the
importance of preserving the beneficent purpose of the
statute and observed:-
“14. …….. We shall therefore proceed to
examine the provisions of the Act on the footing
that the test for determining whether the
Government is bound by a statute is whether it is
expressly named in the provision which it is
contended binds it, or whether it “is manifest that
from the terms of the statute, that it was the
intention of the legislature that it shall be bound”,
and that the intention to bind would be clearly made
out if the beneficent purpose of the statute would
be wholly frustrated unless the Government were
bound.”
54. Having answered the reference, we hold that the
provisions of SICA, in particular Section 22, shall prevail
over the provision for the recovery of debts in the RDDB
Act. In these circumstances, as already directed by the
two-Judge Bench of this Court, the Judgment and Order
dated 23.02.06 of the High Court of Delhi is set aside. As
far as the writ petitions are concerned, whether on the
ground that Section 22 of the SICA acts as a bar to the
7
AIR 1964 SC 669
39
Page 40
recovery proceedings under the RDDB Act or whether the
protection of SICA is not available to the appellant
company since the recovery proceedings under the RDDB
Act had been concluded, the writ petitions would have to
be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. The present
appeal is allowed.
……………………….…..........…..CJI.
[H.L.DATTU]
................................………J.
[S.A. BOBDE]
...............................………J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
NEW DELHI,
OCTOBER 27, 2014
40
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