1) Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D.Ramarathnam. Asst. Passport Officer, 1967 (3) SCR 52
2) Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 (1) SCC 248
3) Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd., (1994) 4 SCC 710
4) Suresh Nanda v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2008 (3) SCC 674
5) Damji Valaji Shah & another Vs. L.I.C. of India & others [AIR 1966 SC 135]
6) Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & others [1999 (7) SCC 76]
7) Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and others [AIR 1999 SC 3125]
8) Sanjeev R.Apte v. I.F.C.I. Ltd., and others, 2008 (154) DLT 77
9) Smt.Annai Jayabharathi v. The Debt Recovery Tribunal & Anr., CDJ 2005 Ker HC 171
10) Allahabad Bank v. Radhakrishna Maity, AIR 1999 SC 3426
11) Ramalinga v. Radha, 2011 (4) CTC 481
12) Sinnaswami Chettiar v. Aligi Goundan and others, AIR 1924 Madras 893 (OVERRULED)
13) Nallagatti Goundan v. Ramana Gounda and others, AIR 1925 Madras 170
14) Income Tax Officer v. M.K.Mohammad Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430
15) .S.Mittal v. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal and others, 2004 DRTC 188
16) ICICI Ltd., Bangalore v. Passport Officer, Bangalore and others, AIR 2002 Karnataka 118
17) Smt.Annai Jayabharathi v. The Debt Recovery Tribunal & Anr., CDJ 2005 Ker HC 171.
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issue of a Writ:
O R D E R D.MURUGESAN, J.
.....................
This Court is called upon to decide the question as to whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal would have power to direct the borrower or the guarantor to surrender the passport to the Tribunal and to further restrain the borrower or the guarantor from leaving the country without the written permission of the Debts Recovery Tribunal/the Debt
Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be.
...............
9. The Apex Court, in Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd., (1994) 4 SCC 710, while considering the provisions of the Act and the powers of the Tribunal, has observed that the powers of the Tribunal, except as stated in sub-section (2) of Section 19, are wider than the powers of a Civil Court and the only limitation was that it should observe principles of natural justice. The Apex Court has observed as follows:-
We, however, do not agree with the reasoning adopted by the High Court. When Section 22 of the Act says that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not mean that it will not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a Court as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to observe the principles of natural justice.
The Apex Court has further observed:-
It will, thus, be seen that while there are no limitations on the powers of the Tribunal under the Act, the Legislature has thought fit to restrict the powers of the authorities under various enactments while exercising certain powers under those enactments. ... Further, when power is given to the Tribunal to make an interim order by way of injunction or a stay, it inheres in it the power to grant that order even ex parte, if it is so in the interest of justice. ..
..............
26. In the instant case, though Debts Recovery Tribunal constituted under the RDDBFI Act is not a court stricto sensu, still, undoubtedly, it exercises judicial powers and such judicial powers flow from the RDDBFI Act. As we have already held, the said Act not only empowers the Tribunal to pass interim orders in order to recover the dues, but also enables to regulate its own procedures. Though there is no specific provision in the Act for impounding a passport, such power is inherent in the Tribunal conferred under Section 19(25) of the RDDBFI Act. The power of the Tribunal to make such order can be traced as well to Section 22 of the RDDBFI Act and Rule 18 of the Rules. Clause 75 of the Second Schedule to Income-tax Act, is also made applicable to the Tribunals by virtue of provisions of Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act. Thus, we hold that the power of the Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal to impound a passport has not been either expressly or impliedly excluded by the provisions of the Passport Act. Even while we hold so, having regard to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Menaka Gandhi's case, supra, holding that a right to hold passport cannot be deprived as it may amount to infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the power under Section 19(25) cannot be exercised as a matter of routine and has to be exercised in deserving cases and that too sparingly. While issuing such order, the Tribunal should satisfy itself as to whether such directions are absolutely necessary in the given set of facts and to meet the ends of justice since the satisfaction of the Tribunal is subject to judicial review.
2) Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 (1) SCC 248
3) Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd., (1994) 4 SCC 710
4) Suresh Nanda v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2008 (3) SCC 674
5) Damji Valaji Shah & another Vs. L.I.C. of India & others [AIR 1966 SC 135]
6) Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & others [1999 (7) SCC 76]
7) Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and others [AIR 1999 SC 3125]
8) Sanjeev R.Apte v. I.F.C.I. Ltd., and others, 2008 (154) DLT 77
9) Smt.Annai Jayabharathi v. The Debt Recovery Tribunal & Anr., CDJ 2005 Ker HC 171
10) Allahabad Bank v. Radhakrishna Maity, AIR 1999 SC 3426
11) Ramalinga v. Radha, 2011 (4) CTC 481
12) Sinnaswami Chettiar v. Aligi Goundan and others, AIR 1924 Madras 893 (OVERRULED)
13) Nallagatti Goundan v. Ramana Gounda and others, AIR 1925 Madras 170
14) Income Tax Officer v. M.K.Mohammad Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430
15) .S.Mittal v. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal and others, 2004 DRTC 188
16) ICICI Ltd., Bangalore v. Passport Officer, Bangalore and others, AIR 2002 Karnataka 118
17) Smt.Annai Jayabharathi v. The Debt Recovery Tribunal & Anr., CDJ 2005 Ker HC 171.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 11.10.2011
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.MURUGESAN AND
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN
W.P.No.19707 of 2011
ICICI Bank Limited represented by its Chief Manager
Mr.N.Anandakumar having its Zonal Office at
ICICI Bank Towers
4th Floor, West Wing Plot No.24
Ambattur Industrial Estate
Chennai 600 058
.. Petitioner
-vs-
1. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal
Ethiraj Salai, Egmore Chennai 600 008
2. The Debts Recovery Tribunal-2
Deva Towers, 6th Floor No.770-A, Anna Salai Chennai 600 002
3. R.Subramanian
.. Respondents
O R D E R D.MURUGESAN, J.
.....................
This Court is called upon to decide the question as to whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal would have power to direct the borrower or the guarantor to surrender the passport to the Tribunal and to further restrain the borrower or the guarantor from leaving the country without the written permission of the Debts Recovery Tribunal/the Debt
Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be.
...............
9. The Apex Court, in Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd., (1994) 4 SCC 710, while considering the provisions of the Act and the powers of the Tribunal, has observed that the powers of the Tribunal, except as stated in sub-section (2) of Section 19, are wider than the powers of a Civil Court and the only limitation was that it should observe principles of natural justice. The Apex Court has observed as follows:-
We, however, do not agree with the reasoning adopted by the High Court. When Section 22 of the Act says that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not mean that it will not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a Court as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to observe the principles of natural justice.
The Apex Court has further observed:-
It will, thus, be seen that while there are no limitations on the powers of the Tribunal under the Act, the Legislature has thought fit to restrict the powers of the authorities under various enactments while exercising certain powers under those enactments. ... Further, when power is given to the Tribunal to make an interim order by way of injunction or a stay, it inheres in it the power to grant that order even ex parte, if it is so in the interest of justice. ..
...................
But, insofar as RDDBFI Act is concerned, the inherent power of the Tribunal does not flow from the general law namely, Code of Civil Procedure, as it flows from another statute namely, RDDBFI Act, which is also a special enactment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has made it very clear that such inherent power flowing from RDDBFI Act is wider than the inherent power which would normally flow on a civil Court. Therefore, the provisions of the Passport Act shall not exclude the inherent power of the Debts Recovery Tribunal to pass any interim order to meet the ends of justice for which power flows from the special enactment namely, RDDBFI Act. ..............
26. In the instant case, though Debts Recovery Tribunal constituted under the RDDBFI Act is not a court stricto sensu, still, undoubtedly, it exercises judicial powers and such judicial powers flow from the RDDBFI Act. As we have already held, the said Act not only empowers the Tribunal to pass interim orders in order to recover the dues, but also enables to regulate its own procedures. Though there is no specific provision in the Act for impounding a passport, such power is inherent in the Tribunal conferred under Section 19(25) of the RDDBFI Act. The power of the Tribunal to make such order can be traced as well to Section 22 of the RDDBFI Act and Rule 18 of the Rules. Clause 75 of the Second Schedule to Income-tax Act, is also made applicable to the Tribunals by virtue of provisions of Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act. Thus, we hold that the power of the Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal to impound a passport has not been either expressly or impliedly excluded by the provisions of the Passport Act. Even while we hold so, having regard to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Menaka Gandhi's case, supra, holding that a right to hold passport cannot be deprived as it may amount to infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the power under Section 19(25) cannot be exercised as a matter of routine and has to be exercised in deserving cases and that too sparingly. While issuing such order, the Tribunal should satisfy itself as to whether such directions are absolutely necessary in the given set of facts and to meet the ends of justice since the satisfaction of the Tribunal is subject to judicial review.
I am offered DRT and many types of legal and recovery services. In finance the term recovery refers to collection of amount due. The normally recovery depends on the purpose, time and condition, business running process etc.
ReplyDelete