In State of Bihar Vs. Maharana Pratap Singh, the Hon'ble Patna High Court while setting aside the decision of a single judge bench held that the learned Single Bench appears to have exercised appellate jurisdiction over findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority, which is impermissible in law, since, while exercising the power of judicial review, only the decision-making process has to be examined and not the merit and demerit of the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. The Court cannot re-appreciate the merits of allegation levelled against the charged officer and return a finding that the same is not made out.
Govt. of A.P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan (2006) 2 SCC 373
SCC p. 379, para 11.)”
9. In a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran reported as (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Court held to the following effect:-
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:(i) reappreciate the evidence;(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
B. Karunakar, 1994 AIR SCW 1050
The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called.
(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice – or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action – the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” and not adequate opportunity, i.e., between “no notice”/”no hearing” and “no fair hearing.”
(a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it “void” or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem).
(b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the stand-point of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query.
(It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.)
(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them.
(7) There may be situations where the interests of state or public interest may call for a curtailing or the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision.”
14. We may also add that strict rules of evidence are not applicable with regard to departmental proceeding as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
# T.N.C.S. Corporation Ltd. v. K. Meerabai reported as (2006) 2 SCC 255
“21. Similarly, the learned Single Judge was patently misconceived in reaching the conclusion that the acquittal of the respondent by the Court of CJM clinched the issue in the departmental enquiry, while losing sight of the wellsettled law that the scope of criminal proceedings in the court of criminal law and the scope of disciplinary proceedings in a departmental enquiry are quite distinct and exclusive and independent.22. The learned Single Judge has also failed to appreciate that the standards of proof required in the criminal proceedings and the departmental disciplinary actions are not the same.23. We have perused the order of dismissal dated 28-11- 1991 passed by the disciplinary authority and the order of the Appellate Authority dated 16-6-1994 upholding the order of dismissal with dispassionate judicial mind. In our opinion, both the orders aforementioned are exhaustive in details, impeccable on facts and armed with irrefutable reasons in support of the conclusions.24. The learned Judges of the Division Bench who dismissed the writ appeal filed by the Corporation upheld the patently erroneous judgment of the learned Single Judge virtually on all those grounds and reasons which had appealed to the learned Single Judge. While passing the impugned judgment, the learned Judges have lost sight of the following:(i) the scope of the criminal proceedings in a criminal court and the scope of disciplinary proceedings in a departmental enquiry are quite distinct, exclusive and independent of each other;(ii) the criminal proceedings in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and disciplinary proceedings were on totally different sets of facts and charges;(iii) the order of dismissal dated 28-11-1991 (Annexure P-5) passed by the disciplinary authority and the order dated 16-6-1994 of the Appellate Authority, dismissing the respondent‟s departmental appeal are exhaustive orders, incorporating the statement of the correct and relevant facts of the case and impeccable conclusions based on dispassionate appreciation of the evidence on record and supported by legally irrefutable reasons.25. In our opinion, both the learned Single Judge and the learned appellate Judges of the High Court failed to consider and appreciate dispassionately and judicially the Corporation‟s most emphatically pronounced plea that it would be virtually impossible for them to reinstate the respondent who was found in the departmental enquiry guilty of misappropriation and other malpractices causing thereby enormous loss in stock and cash to the Corporation, an institution primarily concerned with the distribution of essential commodities among the weaker sections of the population of the State of Tamil Nadu whose dismissal from service has been upheld by the Appellate Authority vide its very detailed, well-considered and well-reasoned verdict and in whose integrity, honesty and trustworthiness the Corporation have lost their faith completely and absolutely.
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