Legal Reference Library

In DCIT Vs. M/s Beas Valley Corporation Ltd.,  the ITAT Chandigarh held that the interest from Bank deposits prior to the period of commencement of the business is Capital receipt. It further allowed the assesses’ claim to set off the interest so received on short term deposit during the year on the loan received against the interest payable on PFC loan so as to reduce the cost of project. Assessee, Beas Valley Power is a Government Company promoted by HPSEBL to execute the 100 MW UHL Stage -III in Joginder Nagar Distt. Mandi. While completing the assessment against the assessee- Company, the AO noted that the interest on bank deposits earned by the Company before the commencement of business is a taxable income and should have be shown under the head ” Income from other sources”. Article referred: http://www.taxscan.in/interest-bank-deposits-prior-period-commencement-business-capital-receipt-itat-chandigarh/8515/

In ACIT v. M/s.Nokia Siemens Networks (P) Ltd, the Delhi ITAT held that assessee cannot be treated as Assessee-in-Default for Late payment of TDS due to system and connectivity issues at the bankers’ end. In the instant case, assessee was held as assessee-in-default for delay in deposit of TDS. Assessee maintained that the amount of TDS was debited from the bank account of the assessee on the due date i.e. 7.10.2009 and the delay in deposit of such tax by a day was on account of system and connectivity issues at the bankers’ end, which were beyond the control of the assessee. On appeal, the first appellate authority held in favour of assessee. However, it confirmed the levy of interest for late payment of TDS. Both the assessee and the Revenue preferred appeals against the order. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue contended that the first appellate authority erred in holding in favour of the assessee in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs. Ogale Glass Work

The Delhi High Court, in the case of VK Bhatnagar vs Canara Bank and Anr, has directed the bank to compensate the petitioner for the trauma and humiliation caused due to wrongful attachment of his property because of the bank’s negligence arising due to mistaken identity. The petition was filed by VK Bhatnagar, whose property was wrongly attached by Canara Bank for default of payment by a debtor of the same name. The petitioner faced extreme humiliation since not only was the warrant of attachment affixed to his property, but loudspeakers too proclaimed the same. The petitioner then filed objections before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, stating that he had undertaken no financial transactions with Canara Bank and also disclosing his parentage. He also showed that he was a resident of Delhi where as the debtor is a resident of Lucknow. However, no reply was offered by Canara Bank in response to the objections filed. Harassed, the petitioner filed a writ petition against the ban

In SAVYASACHI K. SAHAI vs Union Of India, the Delhi High Court has dismissed a review petition filed by four applicants who claimed to be the sons of previous Mutawalli or caretakers of the dargah at Amir Khusro Park and, therefore, asserted their right to some construction inside the tikona graveyard park, also known as Amir Khusro park. Mohd Shakeel, Mohd Allauddin and Mohd Mehmood (claiming to be the three sons of the late Mohd Yusuf and the late Mohammed Yunus) and Mohd Nasir (son of Mohd Hakmuddin) had sought review of an order passed by the high court on May 16. Under the said order, the court had observed that the petitioners did not have sufficient documentary evidence to prove their claim and sought a status report from the authorities concerned. What the court said After examining all the submissions and evidence on record, a division bench of Acting Chief Justice Gita Mittal and Justice C Hari Shankar held that presumption of possession over an open land always is deem

In Ahok Kr. Todi Vs. C.B.I., the Calcutta High Court dealt with framing of charges and held that - Criminal P.C. 1973 – S. 216 (5) – Sanction – At the time of dealing with the Section 216(5) of Cr.P.C. the court is to see if any sanction has been given on same facts or not, irrespective of any offence. Criminal P.C. 1973 – Ss. 226 & 227 – When the court shall frame charges – What are the factors to be considered by the court at the time of disposal of an application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. – Held, Court should be very cautious in allowing an application Section 227 Cr.P.C. because without affording any opportunity to the prosecution to substantiate the allegation through witness, the accused gets an escape from the net of law. The Court is to see if any material for presumption is there or not. If the answer is affirmative, charge has to be framed. Criminal P.C. 1973 – Ss. 190 (1) (b) r/w. 197 – Cognizance – Supplementary Charge-sheet – What should be the basis – If the

In URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE TRUSTEE LTD. V/s. NEELKANTH TOWNSHIP AND CONSTRUCTION PVT. LTD (Corporate Debtor), the THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL while deciding on the objection of the Corporate Debtor that the applicant herein cannot file this application as a financial creditor when the applicant is continuing as one of the shareholders of the Company replied that since this court has not said anywhere if the financial creditor happens to be shareholder as well, the shareholder in the capacity of financial creditor cannot initiate insolvency resolution process, since it is the case of the financial creditor that 90% of the funding arisen by the company is only through this claim, this applicant claim cannot be shut on the ground the applicant continuing as shareholder. As there is no legal bar against this applicant to make his claim as a financial creditor, this Bench cannot read into such proposition to deprive the right of this applicant. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the

In Anwar Basith v. ACIT, the Bangalore ITAT held that the income of minor beneficiaries can be clubbed to income of parents under section 64(1)(a) of Income Tax Act, 1961. Assessee was a partner of Firm, M/s. INJ Enterprises, along with her husband and three minor children with equal distribution of profit among the partners including the three beneficiaries. The partnership firm was dissolved in the year 1989 with a condition that all the 5 partners would possess the asset and the liability of the firm as coowners and tenants in common and have equal shares in land & building. One of the source of funds used by M/s. INJ Enterprises for construction and development of the aforesaid property was a loan from Dr. Nayeema Khan Trust for which the Firm was paying interest. The said Trust was formed by assessee and her husband, Mr. Maqsood Ahmed as a trustee and their children as beneficiaries of the trust. While completing assessment against the assessee, the AO noted that to Pay

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) in SHEO PRAKASH GUPTA & ANR vs KANPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, said that it is common parlance that, in the builder- buyer agreements the terms are framed as favorable and suitable to the builders/ service providers. In our view, these are unconscionable contracts. The builder exercise his right to charge penalty or interest at 18-24% on the delayed payment of installments. Thus, in our view, in the interest of natural justice the consumers at large deserve to receive same interest from opposite parties in cases of fault or deficiency. The commission made this observation while dealing with an appeal against the state commission dismissing their complaints against the builders. The complaint was regarding unfair trade practice and deficiency in service by the Kanpur Development Authority in keeping the huge amount for more than a year and refunding it without interest. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/builder-bu

The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) has clarified that trade advances would not attract the provisions of “deemed dividend” under the provisions of Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act. As per section 2(22) clause (e) of the Income Tax Act, “dividend” includes any payment by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, of any sum by way of advance or loan to a shareholder, being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power, or to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest (hereafter in this clause referred to as the said concern) or any payment by any such company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder, to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits. The B

In N.SATHEESH KUMAR vs FAMILY COURT, NEDUMANGADU, the Kerala High Court has held that if the counsel of a litigant is aggrieved in a cause initiated by his client and if he has an independent cause of action, he can sue in his own name. The counsel for a litigant before the family court had himself challenged before the high court the objection raised by the registry of the court with regard to attestation in in vakalath, which he filed along with the maintenance case. Justice Dama Seshadri Naidu, speaking for the division bench, headed by Justice PN Ravindran, said: “It needs no much cogitation on our part to hold that a counsel cannot carry legal proceedings in his own name in a case initiated by his client. This proposition, however, needs to be qualified. If the counsel is aggrieved and, even in a cause imitated by his client, if he has an independent cause of action, he can sue in his own name.” The court observed that had the registry refused to register or number a case be

In Rajan Vs. Biju, Kerala High Court has held that in a claim under Section 163A of the Act, dependency has no relevancy because the persons eligible to file an application for compensation for death are the legal heirs and not the legal representatives. The High court also held that the view taken by the Division Bench in Kadeeja v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, 2013 is correct and the view of the court in Joseph v. Giji Varghese, 2009 is not a correct proposition of law.

The Karnataka High Court in D. GUNDAPPA vs State of Karnataka has observed that mere non-production of the accused from time to time and failure of the Magistrate to pass express order remanding the accused to custody do not vitiate the proceedings, nor does it confer a right on the accused to seek for his release on bail. The Bench comprising Justice H.G. Ramesh And Justice John Michael Cunha however clarified that the production of the accused before the Magistrate as mandated in section 167(2)(b) and section 209 CrPC is a rule and non-production of the accused is only an exception and it is only when the physical production of the accused is not possible on account of his hospitalization or such other unavoidable reasons, the Magistrate cannot refuse to extend the remand merely on ground of non-production of the accused. In such event, it is incumbent on the Investigating Officer to make necessary requisition supported by genuine documents for the satisfaction of the learned Mag

Madurai Bench of the High Court of Madras in S.Robinson Vs 1.Tamil Nadu State Information Commission has held that the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005 cannot be invoked at the first instance, if an effective alternative remedy is available to obtain such information. “Although the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has elaborately made his submission and taken this Court through the Scheme of RTI Act, particularly, Sections 4, 8 and 22 of the RTI Act, I am unable to persuade myself that RTI Act can be invoked for all purposes regardless of the fact that there is existence of alternative effective mechanism provided under the respective departments for seeking information. If such recourse is encouraged and entertained it will destroy the very frame work of the respective mechanism which provides for furnishing information under the respective department,” Justice V. Parthiban observed. The Court was hearing a Petition filed by Mr. S. Robinson, challenging an order

In AVTEC Limited v. DCIT, the division of the Delhi High Court held that AO is bound to look at the litigation history of the assessee and cannot expect the assessee to inform him.  In the instant case, the Petitioner, engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling of automobiles, power trains and power shift transmissions along with their components, approached the High Court challenging the re-assessment order passed against them. For the year 2006-07, the Petitioner entered into a Business Transfer Agreement with Hindustan Motors Ltd, as per which, the Petitioner took over the business from HML.  While filing income tax return for the said year, the petitioner claimed the expenses incurred in respect of professional and legal charges for the purpose of taking over of the business from HML as capital expenses and claimed depreciation. Though the above claim was denied by the AO, the ITAT allowed the claim on second appeal filed by the assessee. Though the department prefe

In CIT v. M/S Rama Educational Society, the division bench of the Allahabad High Court held that benefit of section 80G of the Income Tax Act cannot be granted to assessee merely on ground that it satisfies all the conditions prescribed under section 10(23)(c) of the Income Tax Act. While quashing the ITAT order, the bench confirmed the order of the CIT denying exemption to the assessee for want of regular maintenance of Books of Accounts. Respondent-assessee, a society running a Dental College and Research Centre had availed exemption under s. 80 G of the IT Act. On expiry of the exemption, they made an application for renewal of the same. However, the Commissioner rejected the application on grounds that the department recovered and seized unaccounted cash amount belongs to the assessee during a search and the assessee was not properly maintaining its books of accounts. He was of the opinion that the exemption is not available to the assessee as they does not satisfies condition (iv)

In a significant judgement, the , has held that private self financing Colleges cannot withhold certificates of students, for payment of amount. The practise of withholding the certificates, and non-issuance of transfer certificate to students, to coerce them into meeting unconscionable demands like paying entire course fee for leaving the course midway, or to force them to serve the institution after completion of course, etc is very rampant. In clear unambiguous terms, the Court has held that such practise is illegal and opposed to public policy. Often faced with the supreme bargaining position of the Colleges, the students often execute bonds authorising colleges to do so. But, such bonds have no validity in the eyes of law. It was held that :- “The agreements obtained by the College from petitioners authorising them to withhold the certificates of the petitioners cannot be accepted as an approved social conduct and the same, in that sense, is unethical. Further, agreements of tha

In N.K. Bhasin vs Union of India, the division bench of the Allahabad High Court upheld the constitutional validity of provisions of Finance Act, 1994 imposing Service Tax on rented immovable property. While dismissing a bunch of writ petitions, the Court also confirmed the vires of connected circulars passed by the Ministry of Finance. The petitioners in the instant case, approached High Court challenging the constitutionality of Sections 75(A)(6)(h) and 77 of Finance Act, 2010 and Sections 65(90)(a) and 65(105)(zzzz) read with Section 66 of Finance Act, 1994 as amended by Finance Act, 2007 and Finance Act, 2010. They urged that the provisions are illegal, arbitrary and lacking legislative competence infringing Articles 14, 246 and 265 of Constitution of India. They further impugned the validity of circulars dated 04.01.2008 and 22.05.2007. The bench noticed that a similar issue was raised before various High Courts wherein these Courts upheld the validity of the above provision

In ITO v. Raghu Nandan Modi, the ITAT Kolkata held that rent-Free accommodation received by a Part Time-Director cum Employee from the Company cannot be taxable as “Business Income” under the provisions of Income Tax Act. Assessee, in the instant case, was a part-time Director of M/s Prabhukripa Overseas Ltd. during his tenure, assessee received rent-free accommodation in the flat owned by the Company, POL. AO completed assessment by holding the value of the rent fee accommodation is taxable in the hands of the assessee under Section 2(24)(iv) of the Income Tax Act r.w.s. 17(2)/ 28(iv) of the Income Tax Act. Before the appellate authorities, assessee contended that he was holding the post of part-time director in the company as well as the post of employee to look after the export business of POL. The assessee has received no salary from the company, therefore the perquisites value u/s. 17(2) r.w.s. Rule 3 of the Rules becomes nil. He further contended that s. 28(iv) would not appl

In Business Strategy Group v. ACIT, the ITAT, Delhi held that the loan obtained from a Company wherein the partners of the Assessee-Firm are the shareholders cannot be termed as ‘deemed dividend’ of the Firm and therefore, it is not taxable in the hands of the Firm under the provisions of Income Tax Act. Assessee-Firm is engaged in the business of rendering Management Consultancy Services. The partners of the Firm are equal share holders in a Private Ltd Company, i.e, M/s TMI Associates Pvt. Ltd. The AO found that the assessee firm had shown a loan of Rs. 3 lakhs from M/s TMI Associates Pvt. Ltd and treated the same as the deemed dividend which is taxable in the hands of the assessee-Firm. Before the Trbunal, the assessee contended that it is not a share holder in the said Company and Section 2(22)(e) has no application to the amounts received from a Company by the non-shareholder. The bench noted the decision in Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax Vs. Bhaumik Colour (P) Ltd wherein i

The Amritsar bench of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has recently rule that a Holding Company is entitled to get deduction in respect of the debt unrecovered from its subsidiary company under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Coming to the facts of the case, the assessees, M/s Sarup Tanneries Ltd, is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of leather goods, Shoe upper, soles etc. The Assessing Officer, while completing assessment for the relevant assessment year, has disallowed the claim made by the assessee in respect of loss written off due to its subsidiary company in US on ground that such losses claimed by assessee were not related to the business of assessee. On appeal, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) partly allowed the impugned order. The case was brought before the ITAT. The Revenue contended that reliance should be placed on the decision in Amalgamations Pvt. Ltd vs. CIT (1969) 226 ITR 188 (SC). The Tribunal found that the assessee had issued standby

In DCIT v. M/s. The Hooghly Mills Co.Ltd, the ITAT Kolkata held that shareholding by Subsidiary Company is irrelevant while considering ‘deemed dividend’ liability of Holding Company under section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act. Assessing Officer, while completing assessment against the assessee-Company, found that assessee had during the previous year accepted the loans of Rs.10,20,00,000/- from M/s. Mega Resources Ltd, in which the subsidiary company of the assessee holds equity shares. The Officer, considering  the shareholding of both the assessee and its subsidiary company and concluded that the assessee held more than 10% of the voting power in M/s. Mega Resources Ltd,. and therefore, the assessee is liable to pay tax on ‘deemed dividend’ under provision of section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act. The first appellate authority allowed the plea of the assessee on first appeal. Aggrieved by the order of the first appellate authority, the department approached the Tribunal relying on

Contents Meaning of Evidence Case Laws on Evidence Definition of word “evidence” under the Evidence Act is exhaustive What would be the meaning of the ‘evidence‘ has been elucidated by Hon’ble Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hardip Singh & Ors vs. State of Punjab and others (2014) 3 SCC 92, wherein it was held as under: For getting free Indian Judgments in your inbox click Subscribe According to Section 3 of the Evidence Act, ‘evidence’ means and includes: (1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence; (2) all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such statements are called documentary evidence; # Meaning of Evidence According to Tomlin’s Law Dictionary, Evidence is “the means from which an inference may logically be drawn as to the existence of a fact. It consists of proof by te

In  Finolex Cables Limited Vs. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd., the two companies had entered into a contract and MTNL had invoked BG because of non-delivery. The question before the Delhi High Court was whether the invocation of the BG by MTNL in terms of Clause 7.4 of the PO was justified. The High Court opined - 41. MTNL has no explanation whatsoever for suddenly springing on FCL the unilateral invocation of the BG which it made FCL renew from time to time. There was no loss suffered by MTNL on account of the failure of FCL to supply the cables. Merely because Clause 7.4 of the PO entitles MTNL to seek LD up to a maximum of 10% cannot justify the amount it sought to recover, namely, the entire sum of Rs.36,75,300, which according to the learned Arbitrator was approximately 10% of the contract value. 42. The law in relation to LD has been explained by the Supreme Court in its decision in Kailash Nath Associates v. Delhi Development Authority (supra). In para 43 of the said decis

In Chandi Prasad Vs. State, the Himachal Pradesh High Court while deciding on Adverse Possession said that - It is well recognized proposition in law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner’s title must be peaceful, open and continuous. It is equally settled that a person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour and since such a person is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish necessary facts to establish his adverse possession. In the

High Court of Delhi Louis Vuitton v. Gaurav Bhatia and Ors. MANU/DE/1443/2017 23.05.2017 Intellectual Property Rights Damages have to be actual and not superfluous, Courts are not supposed to do guess work and grant damages Present suit has been filed by Plaintiff seeking permanent injunction against Defendants, restraining them from infringing its trademark, copyright and also from passing off goods of Plaintiff as that of theirs and for rendition of accounts and damages. It is submitted that, act of Defendant offering counterfeit products of Plaintiff which are identical to product of Plaintiff amounts to infringement of its trademark.  Suit has been filed by a duly authorized person. Various documents showing registration of trademark in favour of Plaintiff proves that, Plaintiff is registered owner of trademark Louis Vuitton and logo "Toile Monogram" pattern. Documents on record also conclusively show that, Defendants 1 and 2 have been indulg

The Supreme Court in Mrs. Hema Khattar & ANR. Vs. Shiv Khera has held that When an agreement is terminated by one party alleging breach committed by the other, the arbitration clause still survives and continues to be operative. This is particularly so when the contract is revoked by mutual consent and the arbitration clause is framed in general terms. The Supreme Court referred to earlier decisions in Sundaram Finance Limited and Another vs. T. Thankam (2015) 14 SCC 444, where this Court has held as under:- "8. Once there is an agreement between the parties to refer the disputes or differences arising out of the agreement to arbitration, and in case either party, ignoring the terms of the agreement, approaches the civil court and the other party, in terms of Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, moves the court for referring the parties to arbitration before the first statement on the substance of the dispute is filed, in view of the peremptory language of Section 8 of the Ar

In awarding tenders, the technical experience of a subsidiary company can be taken into account and the parent company cannot be ousted only because it has no experience on its own, the Supreme Court  said while upholding the award of a Metro rail project to a Chinese government company. In this judgment, Consortium of Titagarh Firema Adler SPA vs Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation, the contract for 69 passenger cars and training of personnel was awarded to the Chinese company, though its bid was only marginally lower than that of the consortium.  Therefore, it moved the Bombay High Court where the writ petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that there is no bar, whatsoever, express or implied, in the tender document to treat the parent company along with its 100% wholly owned subsidiaries as one entity. Therefore, the scope of judicial review should be limited in adjudging the decision taken by R 1 in the best interest of the project, and thereby, the public. the concept of “Go

In Prerna Dewan Vs. IREO Fiveriver, the Opposite Party has stated that possession of the plot, in question, could not be offered to the complainant, within the period stipulated in the Agreement for want of development work at the site, on account of the reasons beyond its control i.e. on account of force majeure circumstances like delay in sanction of layout plans by the Competent Authorities; delay in grant of NOC from the Irrigation Department; delay in clearance and delayed grant of licence for additional land measuring 10.594 acres plus 18.343 acres, by the Competent Authorities, as the area was situated in a squatted small pockets; delay in approvals for environment clearance by the Competent Authorities; and also stay on construction on the land, in question, granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The State Consumer Dispute Resolution Commission rejected the above contention by stating It was the bounden duty of the opposite party, to get approved the final layout plan

The Karnataka High Court, in the case of M/s Uttam Industrial Engineering Ltd vs M/s Shree Basaveshwar Sugars Ltd, has held that a winding-up petition has serious ramifications on the financial standing of a company and cannot be used in cases where there is a bona fide dispute regarding the amount owed by one party to the other and in such cases the company court should relegate the matter either to the civil court or arbitral tribunal. In this case, Uttam Industrial Ltd entered into a contract with Basaveshwar Sugars Ltd to provide machinery and equipment for a sugar plant. The petitioner fulfilled part of its obligation and demanded payment for the same. There was a dispute regarding the amount to be paid by the respondent company to the petitioner company. However, though the respondent company had initially agreed to pay a specified amount upon reconciliation of their accounts, they subsequently refused to pay the same. Therefore, a winding-up petition was filed before the h

In Majestic Properties Vs. Arun Dhandhania, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission has held that It is the duty of the complainants to prove that the booking done by them was not for a commercial purpose and that, they fall within the definition of ‘Consumer’ under the Act. The facts involved in these cases show that the main person in the whole episode is Arun Dhandhania who booked one residential flat for himself, one for his son and three other flats in the names of various companies, which were operating through him only, as Director. Although booking in three cases has been made in the name of three different companies, it has not been made clear anywhere in the evidence produced by the complainants that the said property was required for residential purpose in any manner. During arguments, it was stated that the residential property was required for the purpose of housing various directors/employees from time to time. It has nowhere been stated, however, that the p

In H.P. State Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs. State of H.P., the Himachal Pradesh High Court held that dues to the State shall have priority. Referring to various judgments, the court said - “126. While enacting the DRT Act and the Securitisation Act, Parliament was aware of the law laid down by this Court wherein priority of the State dues was recognised. If Parliament intended to create first charge in favour of banks, financial institutions or other secured creditors on the property of the borrower, then it would have incorporated a provision like Section 529-A of the Companies Act or Section 11(2) of the EPF Act and ensured that notwithstanding series of judicial pronouncements, dues of banks, financial institutions and other secured creditors should have priority over the State’s statutory first charge in the matter of recovery of the dues of sales tax, etc. However, the fact of the matter is that no such provision has been incorporated in either of these enactments despite conferme

The credibility of a witness cannot be judged merely on the basis of his close relation with the deceased and as such cannot be a ground to discard his testimony, if it otherwise inspires confidence and, particularly so, when it is corroborated by the evidence of independent and injured witnesses. While appreciating the evidence of the witnesses related to the deceased, having strained relations with the accused party, their evidence cannot be discarded solely on that basis, but the court is required to carefully scrutinize it and find out if there is scope for taking view whereby the court can reach to the conclusion that it is a case of false implication. 1. Masalti v. The State of Uttar Praadesh, AIR 1965 SC 202 Speaking for a 5-Judge Bench P.B.Gajendragadkar, C.J. Said : “…There is no doubt that when a criminal Court has to appreciate evidence given by witnesses who are partisan or interest, it has to be very careful in weighing such evidence. Whether or not there are discrep