Legal Reference Library

Having treated the difference under the head “Business”, the Assessing Officer disallowed the broken period interest payment, which gave rise to the dispute. It was open to the Department to assess the above difference under the head “Interest on securities” under section 18. However, they chose to assess the interest under the head “Business” and, while doing so, the Department taxed broken period interest received,but disallowed broken period interest payment. It is in this light that one has to read the judgment of the Karnataka High Court and the Supreme Court in Vijaya Bank Ltd’s case [1991] 187 ITR 541. In that case, the facts were as follows. During the assessment year under consideration, Vijaya Bank entered into an agreement with Jayalakshmi Bank Limited, whereby Vijaya Bank took over the liabilities of Jayalakshmi Bank. They also took over assets belonging to Jayalakshmi Bank. These assets consisted of two items, viz., Rs.58,568 and Rs.11,630.00. The said amount

While rendering relief to a woman who failed to procure back her gold ornaments from Muthoot Finance Pvt. Ltd., which were pledged while taking a loan, NCDRC directed the Finance Company to reimburse the woman with the current value of 52 grams gold pledged in 2003 with it. Earlier, in Year 2003, the complainant pledged 52 grams of gold for Rs 21,000 with the Paravoor branch of Muthoot Finance Pvt. Ltd. When she approached the concerned branch in April 2004 to take back the ornaments by paying the loan amount with interest, they refused, saying that the ornaments had been transferred to their head office by mistake. Thereafter, she left the town where she was then living and settled in Ernakulam. In May 2011, she approached the Finance Company again to redeem the ornaments pledged, but the said ornaments were not returned to her. Being aggrieved, she approached District Forum with a complaint. Before the Forum, Company contended that the complaint was barred by limitation

This division bench of S. Manikumar and D. Krishnakumar, JJ held that there can be no order for condonation of delay beyond the extended period of limitation, stating that when the legislative intent is indicated by the provisions of special laws that exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act, then authorities under such statutes cannot exercise power to condone the delay. The Court dismissed the writ appeal filed by the Appellant under Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994 against the refusal of condonation of a delay of 223 days in proceedings before the Commissioner of Service Tax (Appeals). The Court noticed that Section 85 of the Finance Act) provides that appeal be filed 3 months from date of communication of order, while the Commissioner (Appeals) is empowered to condone delays of a further three months if satisfied of sufficient cause. The Court noted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which permits the Court to exercise its discretion in condonation of

Upbraiding the Judicial Magistrate who had remanded the petitioner to judicial custody contrary to its orders, in spite of having been granted pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Bench of Sudheendra Kumar, J.  held that once a pre-arrest bail was granted, the same would be in force until either the court or a higher court cancelled the order, on the instance of the Public Prosecutor, on the discovery of new material or circumstances, or of abuse of the indulgence by the accused. The facts disclosed that the petitioner was arrested on 19.01.2016, and upon being produced the next day before the Judicial Magistrate, he produced the order under Section 438 passed by this Bench of the High Court. This was however disregarded by the Magistrate remanding the petitioner to judicial custody. The Court, upon being appraised of the remand of the petitioner and dismissal of his bail application, sought reasons from the Magistrate which were furnish

Deciding upon the question as to whether an advocate could be permitted to appear in person as a power of attorney holder in the absence of a vakalat, the Court held that an advocate holds an exalted position as an officer of the court who should not identify with the cause of his client whom he represents in the lis. A practising lawyer of the Madras High Court sought to plead the case on behalf of the appellants as a power of attornery holder on the  contention that he was not appearing in the robes of an advocate and that any person could function as such for the parties. The Bench of  Chitambaresh and Ramakrishnan, JJ. held that any appearance, application or act in or to any court, required by law to be made by a party in such  court, may be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent or by a pleader. The recognised agent by whom such appearance, application or act may be made or done can as well be a person holding power of attorney of the p

Reviving a bail order cancelled by the Principal Sessions Judge, Madurai, the bench of P. Devadass J. held that, in matters of cancellation of a bail order due to default in complying with the bail conditions, opportunity must be given to the accused persons to present their case. It was held that the cancellation of a bail order cannot be done mechanically as it involves withdrawal of the liberty that has already given to the accused; hence observance of principles of natural justice is a must. In the present case the issue was that the petitioners (husband and wife) had been granted anticipatory bail under Section 438 of CrPC and certain conditions were imposed which included regular appearance before the police at a scheduled time. Due to compliance of the same, the bail conditions with respect to the wife were relaxed. However, the police subsequently filed a petition for cancellation of the bail order on the grounds that the petitioners have not obeyed the bail con

The bench comprising of Justice Shaji P. Chaly, allowed the writ petition and issued a mandamus directing the Kerala State Housing Board and others to ensure that various flats constructed under a housing scheme for residential purposes at the Chinnakkada Housing Accomodation Scheme Site II of the Housing Board, Kollam, are not being used for other commercial purposes. The Housing scheme in question was meant for residential purposes. Further, Clause 19 of the Hire Purchase Agreement for those who opted for hire purchase also restricted use to residential purposes as does Regulation 6 (1) of the Kerala State Housing Board (Formation of Allottees Associations) Regulations, 2000). Nevertheless, various flats in the complex for being used as offices, godowns, training centres etc. Earlier alottees had raised the issue with the Board, whose inaction triggered O.P. No. 28612/2000 before the same court, wherein respondents 1 to 3 had been directed to see that flats were not used for any purp

While interpreting the definition of ‘Husband’s relatives under Section 498A Penal Code, 1860, the Bench comprising of U. Durga Prasad Rao, J. held that the definition could not be stretched to include the wife of one’s elder brother. In the present petition, the Complainant and her husband went to live at the home of the Complainant’s eldest brother in London, who lived with his wife. It was alleged that the complainant’s husband and her sister-in-law entered into an illicit relationship, and that after the Complainant observed them in a compromising position, following which the sister-in-law started spreading rumours that husband of the Complainant did not like the Complainant and that she was unsuited to him. The Court cited U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector of Police, (2009) 6 SCC 757 whereby it was held that the girlfriend or concubine of the husband could not be held to be the relative of the husband and Vijeta Gujra v. State of N.C.T. Of Delhi, (2010) 11 SCC 618, which quash

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12 OF 2016 Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust and Ors. Versus R. Ramanathan and Ors Trustees of a trust are entitled to a wide discretion in administration of trust. A disagreement with exercise of discretion by trustees, however passionate said disagreement might be, does not necessarily lead to a conclusion of maladministration in relation to trust, unless the exercise of discretion is perverse.

A two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India has cautioned the Trial Courts by saying that the virus of seeking adjournment has to be controlled. The Bench of Justices Dipak Misra and Rohinton F. Nariman re-iterated that the recording of evidence should be continuous and followed by arguments and decision thereon within a reasonable time. “That apart, it has also been held that the Courts should constantly endeavour to follow such a time schedule so that the purpose of amendments brought in the Code of Civil Procedure are not defeated”, the Bench added According to Justice Dipak Misra who wrote the Judgment, “If a case ever exposed the maladroit efforts of a litigant to indulge in abuse of the process of Court, the present one is a resplendent example. The factual narration, to which we shall advert to immediately hereinafter, would limpidly show that the defendant-petitioner has endeavoured very hard to master the art of adjournment and on occasions having been successful become qu

The Supreme Court of India in COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT, LA MARTINIERE COLLEGE LUCKNOW, VS. VATSAL GUPTA AND ORS has set aside an Allahabad High Court order wherein it had entertained a Writ petition against an unaided minority private Institution and had passed certain directions. The following is the one page order by the Apex Court Bench comprising of Justices Madan B. Lokur and R.K.Agrawal allowing the Appeal filed by the Management of the Institution. “Leave granted. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Appellant No.1 is an unaided minority private institution. We see no reason how a writ petition against that institution could be entertained. The High Court was clearly in error in entertaining the writ petition and passing subsequent directions. Under the circumstances, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside.” Directing the unaided minority private Institution to allow the petitioner to pursue his educational career

The Supreme Court in B.C. BIYANI PROJECTS PVT. LTD. VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS has held that order for blacklisting a company permanently is impermissible in law. A Bench comprising of Justices Madan B. Lokur and R.K. Agrawal was considering plea of a company which was blacklisted for the award of contracts by the state of Madhya Pradesh since it is stated that there was unreasonable delay in the completion of six contracts awarded to the appellant. The order of blacklisting was for an indefinite period. The Apex Court referred to its earlier decision in Kulja Industries Limited Vs. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Others [(2014) 14 SCC 731], wherein it was held that“debarment” cannot be permanent and the period of “debarment” would invariably depend upon the nature of the offence committed by the erring contractor. The Court observed: “Since the appellant was blacklisted by an order dated 14th March, 2013 and since more than t

A two Judge Bench of Supreme Court of India has held that Section 311-A of Code of Criminal Procedure which has been introduced by Act No.25 of 2005 with effect from 23.06.2006 with respect to the powers of the Magistrate to order the person to give specimen signatures or handwriting is prospective in nature. The Bench of Justice V.Gopala Gowda and Justice R. Banumathi was considering the question whether the Judicial Magistrate/ Executive Magistrate was authorized to take specimen writing and signatures of the said accused during the investigation of the case when no matter was pending before either of them. Section 311-A Cr.P.C. has been inserted on the suggestions of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Banu Misra, (1980) 2 SCC 343: AIR 1980 SC 791, that a suitable legislation be brought along the lines of Section 5 of Identification of Prisoners Act, 1980, to provide for the investiture of Magistrates with powers to issue directions to any person including an accused

The Madras High Court bench has refused to interfere in a cheque bounce case, saying private complainants cannot prefer appeals against acquittal of the accused directly before it without approaching the sessions court concerned. Justice P Devadoss dismissed the appeal by one K Sudhakar against acquittal of the accused, by a judicial magistrate in Tiruchirapalli, saying the criminal appeal against the acquittal of the proprietor of a Chennai-based company was not maintainable. He said a Full Bench (comprising three judges) had laid down norms relating to the rights of victims and complainants on the issue of preferring appeals and also procedures to be adopted in cases where the complainant was also the victim. A victim of the crime, who had prosecuted an accused, had the right of appeal before the court before which such appeal would normally lie under the Criminal Procedure Act, he said. In a private complaint, even if the victim was not a complainant, he had a right to appea

In a landmark order, the Bombay High Court has ruled a woman can invoke criminal provisions of the Domestic Violence Act against female relatives of her husband. Hearing a plea filed by Mumbai resident Sachin Patil and his family, challenging the case filed by his estranged wife, especially against his mother and sister, Justice Ravindra Ghuge said the special law to tackle domestic violence can't be restricted only to the husband's male relatives. "Since the 2005 Act is aimed at protecting women, the submissions of Patil, if accepted, would create an insulation for the female members of the husband's family who may go unpunished for acts amounting to domestic violence," said Justice Ghuge, adding, "When specific allegations are made against the lady members of the husband's family like the mother-in-law, or the sister of the husband etc, the complainant can't be rendered remedy-less by precluding her from arraigning such female members who could be t

Delhi High Court has said that while courts have the power to issue injunction against arbitration proceedings, they should use it rarely. A bench of justices Badar Durrez Ahmed and Sanjeev Sachdeva said courts need to remind themselves that the trend was to minimise interference with arbitration which was the "forum of choice". "Courts must be extremely circumspect and, indeed, reluctant to thwart arbitration proceedings. Thus, while courts in India may have the power to injunct arbitration proceedings, they must exercise that power rarely and only on principles analogous to those found in sections 8 and 45, as the case may be, of the Arbitration Act of 1996," the court said. Section 8 and 45 of the Act provide the circumstances under which judicial authorities can refer parties to arbitration. "Courts need to remind themselves that the trend is to minimize interference with arbitration process as that is the forum of choice," the bench said. The observat

Mere registration of criminal case cannot be a ground to revoke an arms license, the Bombay High Court has held while directing Pune Commissioner of Police to consider afresh an application of a Shiv Sena leader seeking renewal of his license. A division bench of Justices N H Patil and P D Naik gave the direction while hearing a petition filed by Shiv Sena leader Ajay Bhosale from Pune, challenging a February 2011 order of revocation of his arms licence passed by the Pune Police Com .. The license was revoked on the ground that there were several criminal cases filed against Bhosale in 1991. According to the petition, Bhosale, who was elected as municipal councillor in Pune in 2003, had applied for license to possess a fire arm for self-protection. The Pune police commissioner, being the licensing authority, granted the license which was renewed from time-to-time till 2009. Bhosale's lawyer S B Shetye argued that under section 17(B) of the Arms Act, license can be revoked only if t

Magistrates cannot ask the police to investigate a private criminal defamation complaint as it is the complainant who needs to prove the case, the Supreme Court on Wednesday said while prima facie finding fault with a lower court order asking Maharashtra cops to probe the defamation case against Congress Vice President Rahul Gandhi. Gandhi, facing a defamation complaint for his remarks allegedly accusing RSS for assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, has sought its quashing from the apex court which had observed that the leader should not have resorted to "collective denunciation" of an organisation (RSS) and will have to face trial if he does not express regret. A bench of Justices Dipak Misra and RF Nariman, at the outset, referred to an earlier judgement delivered on a batch of pleas, including the one filed by BJP leader Subramanian Swamy and Gandhi each, challenging the constitutional validity of penal defamation law and said that police cannot be asked by judicial magistrates

The Supreme Court on Tuesday said some people appeared to have misunderstood its judgment upholding the criminal defamation provision in the IPC and thought that their right to free speech had been curtailed. During the hearing on Congress vice-president Rahul Gandhi's petition seeking quashing of a criminal defamation case against him, a bench headed by Justice Dipak Misra said, "Any criticism of someone does not make the speech a ground for launching criminal defamation proceedings under Sections 499 and 500 of Indian Penal Code." The judge appeared anguished by the misinformed criticism of the May 13 order. Justice Misra, who had authored the judgment, said, "What we said in our judgment, people must read and understand. It does not cripple or curtail right to free speech. What is curbed is defamatory speech. Every day a writer, politician, critic or an antagonist would make some statement or the other criticising someone or the government. That does

A Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court Avtar Singh vs. Union of India, has summarized the principles to be followed by Employers while dealing with issues related to suppression of information or submitting false information in the verification form by employees/candidates as to the question of having been criminally prosecuted, arrested or as to pendency of a criminal case. The Bench comprising of Justices Ranjan Gogoi, Arun Mishra and Prafulla C. Pant, observed: “The ‘McCarthyism’ is antithesis to constitutional goal, chance of reformation has to be afforded to young offenders in suitable cases, interplay of reformative theory cannot be ruled out in toto nor can be generally applied but is one of the factors to be taken into consideration while exercising the power for cancelling candidature or discharging an employee from service.” Referring to various decisions, the Bench answered the reference to it, as follows. * Information given to the employer by a candidate as to convictio

The Supreme Court in Sudhakaran vs. Corporation of Kochi has held that the requirement of consent of landlord is applicable only when a person intends to obtain a licence for the first time and not for Renewal or subsequent application for obtaining licence on expiry of the period of the existing licence, during the currency of the tenancy. The Apex Court bench comprising of Justices V. Gopala Gowda and Adarsh Kumar Goel set aside the Division Bench judgment of Kerala High Court, where in it was held that that the consent of the owner of the premises is necessary for renewal of tenant’s licence for running a hardware shop. The Court upheld the order of Tribunal, which had held that renewal cannot be refused only on the ground that the fresh consent was not produced by the statutory tenant. The tenant who had applied for renewal of licence to run a hardware shop was refused by Village Panchayath on the ground that he did not produce ‘consent’ from the land lord. The Tribunal for Local S

Application for Rejection of Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be filed at any stage and the Court has to dispose of the same before proceeding with the trial, the Apex Court has reiterated in R. K. ROJA VS. U. S. RAYUDU AND ANOTHER. The High Court, in this case, had taken the view that the same “was not filed at the earliest opportunity” and that appellant was not diligent in prosecuting the application. Therefore, the court took the view that … “this application filed by the first respondent shall be decided at the time of final hearing …” The Bench comprising of Justices Kurian Joseph and R F Nariman observed “We are afraid that the stand taken by the High Court in the impugned order cannot be appreciated. An application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC can be filed at any stage, as held by this Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner and others … “The trial court can exercise the power at any stage of the suit – be

The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mata Sundri Educational Welfare Society vs. Union of India has held that complete restriction cannot be imposed in respect of admission to academic courses on the basis of domicile of the State. Justice Rakesh Kumar Jain quashed a circular issued by Indian Nursing Council restricting admission to Auxiliary Nursing and Midwives (ANM) Course, only to the students domicile of the State of Punjab. The Circular was challenged by an Institute and a number of students contending that it is unconstitutional The Court referring to Apex Court decisions observed: “In Dr. Pradeep Jain’s case (supra), it has been held that “now it is clear on a reading of the Constitution that it recognises only one domicile, namely, domicile in India. Article 5 of the Constitution is clear and explicit on this point and it refers only to one domicile, namely, “domicile in the territory of India”. It is further observed that “it is dangerous to use a legal concept for conveying

In a significant ruling, the Madras High Court Bench here has held that fathers are liable to pay maintenance to children who had attained majority even if the latter were not suffering from any mental or physical abnormalities and yet do not have sufficient financial capacity to maintain themselves. “No doubt, Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not happily worded since it has prescribed certain riders for a daughter or son who has attained majority to claim maintenance from their father. The children must establish that they are under physical disability or they are suffering out of mental injury. “However, there may be cases where a daughter or a son, even after having attained majority, may not have sufficient financial capacity to maintain themselves and they continue to need the support of their father... These are real-life situations. In such cases, courts cannot simply blame those who had drafted the law. “A court must interpret the law. It s

The Supreme Court has held that a farmer, who is in possession of leased land even after expiry of the lease period, cannot be evicted if the owner either acknowledges the tenancy or is accepting the rent. Referring to a provision of the Transfer of Property Act, a three-judge bench headed by Justice Ranjan Gogoi set aside the judgement of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which had ordered the eviction of a farmer after expiry of the lease period of the land. “The operation of section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act would confer legitimacy to the possession of the tenant even after the termination or expiration of the deemed period of the lease so as to confer on him a status akin to that of a statutory tenant and hence protection from eviction as envisaged by the provisions of the Act (Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act) of 1953,” the bench, also comprising Justices Arun Mishra and P C Pant, said. The bench said there was no legal provision to evict the farmers as

The Supreme Court of India in U. SUBHADRAMMA VS. STATE OF A.P has observed that property of a person who was accused of an offence of misappropriation but who died during the pendency of the criminal trial cannot be attached in the hands of his legal representatives under the provisions of Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944. Apex Court bench comprising of Justices S.A. Bobde and Amitava Roy, terming the order of District Judge ‘incomprehensible’ and ‘disturbing’, reiterated that criminal court cannot continue proceedings against a dead person and find him guiltyand such proceedings are contrary to the very foundation of criminal jurisprudence. The Court also observed that the finding of trial court that a person who died during the pendency of trial is alone responsible for the offences is completely vitiated as null and void because a criminal court cannot continue proceedings against a dead person and find him guilty. BACKGROUND Ramachandraiah, was accused of the of

Suspecting the wife’s fidelity and questioning her for moving about with almost every other person, including her father, also amounts to domestic violence, entitling the victim woman subjected to such “emotional abuse” to seek refuge under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, the Madras High Court Bench here has held. Further, rejecting the husband’s contention that he did not have the wherewithal to pay maintenance to his estranged wife, as ordered by a lower court, since he was unemployed, Justice P. Devadass said: “It is too dangerous to accept such a contention. If he has no job, he can work as a coolie and there is no wrong even in begging for feeding wife and children.” Stating that the term ‘domestic violence’ included physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic abuse, the judge said: “In a domestic relationship, domestic violence is analogous to matrimonial cruelty. Domestic violence comprises physical as well as mental cruelty. Menta

Setting aside the orders of National and State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions which had held that a complainant land owner who entered into an agreement with a builder for construction and sharing flats, is not a ‘consumer’ since there was an intention to sell them and let them on rent and earn profit, the Supreme Court (BUNGA DANIEL BABU VS. M/S SRI VASUDEVA CONSTRUCTIONS) held that such an approach is erroneous. The District forum had allowed the complaint of the Land owner against the builder. On appeal by the Builder, the State Commission observed that the agreement was entered into by the complainant for more than two plots and there was an intention to sell them and let them on rent and earn profit, and the transaction was meant for a commercial purpose. The claims of land owner was dismissed on the grounds that he is not a ‘consumer’. This order of State Commission was affirmed by the National Commission. The complainant approached the Supreme Court. Apex Court Bench co

Ex parte hearing, disposal, conviction or sentences are concepts unknown to criminal law and hence neither trial nor appeal against conviction or acquittal could be conducted in the absence of the counsel for the accused, the Madras High Court Bench here has said. Justice P. Devadass made the observation while reversing the dismissal of a criminal appeal by a Sessions Court in Tirunelveli on December 1, 2015. The appeal, preferred by a person convicted by a Judicial Magistrate in a cheque bounce case, had been dismissed for default. “As per Article 22(1) of the Constitution, a person accused of a crime is entitled to be defended by a lawyer of his choice. It is a fundamental right. It is a constitutional right. It is a basic human right. In the absence of counsel for the accused, conducting trial and punishing the accused is against law. It is not fair trial. “If criminal proceedings are conducted in the absence of a lawyer, it is like conducting trial with a deaf an

Directing lower courts to avoid the practice of summoning accused or issuing non-bailable arrest warrants (NBWs) unnecessarily, the Madras High Court Bench here has said: “Courts are entitled to compel the appearance of the accused in criminal cases but such insistence should not be for the mere pleasure of the accused being seen in the dock.” Justice S. Vimala made the observation while setting aside a NBW issued by a Judicial Magistrate at Peraiyur near here on May 24 against Felix Suresh Peter, Inspector of Police, Nanguneri Circle in Tirunelveli district. The warrant had been issued after dismissing a petition filed by him to condone the absence due to his preoccupation with law and order problems in Nanguneri. Pointing out that the Magistrate had allowed a similar condonation petition filed on the same day for the absence of the complainant V. Radhakrishnan, who had accused the Inspector of having assaulted him besides confining him wrongfully, the judge wond

The High court of Andhra Pradesh has observed that mere apprehension of litigants that they might not get justice from a particular judge, because the judge dismissed around 45 appeals within three days, is not a ground to transfer the case to another court. The Appellants before an Additional District Court had approached the High Court by preferring a Transfer petition stating that presiding Judge of the Court, wherein their appeal is pending, had dismissed 45 appeals in a span of three days without taking up final hearing in a proper manner and that therefore, there is a reasonable apprehension in their minds that they may not get justice from the judge. Dismissing the petitions, the bench said: “The transfer petitions are completely devoid of merits and were liable to be thrown out without much ado, on the short ground that the dismissal of 45 appeals in a span of three days can hardly give rise to an apprehension of the nature pleaded by the petitioners. When Courts, which move at

Supreme Court of India Today has held that a Judge cannot assume the power on the basis of his individual perception or notion. The Division Bench of Justices Dipak Misra and Shiva Kirti Singh has further held that “It is well settled in law that a Judge is expected to act in consonance and accord with the legal principles. He cannot assume the power on the basis of his individual perception or notion. He may consider himself as a candle of hope but application of the said principle in all circumstances is not correct because it may have the effect potentiality to affect the society. While using the power he has to bear in mind that “discipline” and “restriction” are the two basic golden virtues within which a Judge functions. He may be one who would like to sing the song of liberty and glorify the same abandoning passivity, but his solemn pledge has to remain embedded to constitution and the laws. There can be deviation”. The Bench was hearing an Appeal by State of Gujarat against an

The Supreme Court of India in M/s Madura Coats Limited v M/s Modi Rubber Limited has ruled that provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 would prevail over the provisions of the companies act. The M/s. Madura Coats Limited was aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order dated 20/05/04 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad which allowed the Special Appeal of the M/s. Modi Rubber Ltd, staying the proceedings before the Company Court consequent upon a winding up order passed against the respondent .The stay was granted till a final decision was taken on the reference made by respondent to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. Dismissing the appeal Justice Madan B Lokur held:”it is quite clear that different situations can arise in the process of winding up a company under the Companies Act but whatever be the situation, whenever a reference is made to the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction under Sec

A two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held that the Supreme Court cannot appreciate the entire evidence de novo in a routine manner while hearing Criminal Appeals, and that too when the conviction is based on concurrent findings of two courts. The Two Judge Bench of Justices Abhay Manohar Sapre and Ashok Bhushan has further held that It is only when the Court comes to a conclusion that the impugned finding though concurrent in nature is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable or/and perverse to the extent that no judicial mind of average capacity can ever record such conclusion, the Court may in appropriate case undertake the exercise of appreciating the evidence to the extent necessary to find out the error. The Bench has dismissed the Appeal filed by the Accused against the final judgment passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh by which the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the him and upheld the judgment of Trial Court convicting him for the offences punishab

The Supreme Court in M/s Umesh Goel vs.Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd. has held that the expression “other proceedings” in Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act does not include Arbitration Proceedings and the ban imposed under the said Section to can have no application to Arbitral proceedings as well as the Arbitration Award.Division Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Justices Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla and C. Nagappan, allowing the appeal against the High Court judgment, also held that Section 35 and 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 is specifically restricted to treat the Award as a decree of a Court and does not equate Arbitration proceedings with court proceedings. BACKGROUND The Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act took a view that the counter claim in an Arbitral Proceedings is covered by the expression “other proceedings” contained in Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act and the appella

A Two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court Today has held that a writ of Mandamus can be issued to authorities to grant remission. The Bench of Justices Dipak Misra and Shiva Kirti Singh has dismissed a writ petition preferred under Article 32 of Constitution of India, by the petitioners, who have been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for more than 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1 lakh and in default of payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months, praying for issue of writ of mandamus to the authorities commanding them to grant remission to them as per the provisions contained in Chapter XIX of the New Punjab Jail Manual, 1996. It is the case of the petitioners that Chapter XIX of the Manual lays down remission and award to the convicts depending upon good conduct and performance of duties allotted to them while they are undergoing sentenc

The Calcutta High Court has quashed Show-cause cum demand notice demanding Service Tax from former Indian Cricket Team captain, Saurav Ganguly. Justice Arijit Banerjee said that that mere failure to disclose a transaction or activity and pay tax thereon or a mere misstatement is not sufficient for invocation of the extended period of limitation, which has been done in this case. The Court also held that the remuneration received by the former Skipper for writing articles and anchoring TV shows would not attract service tax. The court also observed that “brand endorsement” was not a taxable service during the period of time for which the tax demand was raised, and hence such demand cannot be sustained. The Court also said that Ganguly while he played for Indian Premier League (IPL) was not rendering any service which could be classified as business support service. NON-DISCLOSURE SIMPLICITOR CANNOT BE CALLED ‘SUPPRESSION OF FACTS’ An amount of Rs. 1, 51, 66,500, was demanded from the fo